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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the plethora of recent developments in the field of
criminal procedure, this survey does not purport to be exhaustive
in scope. It is necessarily selective and is complemented by other
articles, notes, and surveys relating to criminal procedure issues.1
For the same reason, it was not possible to consider legislative de-
velopments.2 Instead, the survey focuses on the case law. Since
criminal procedure is "constitutionalized" to a large extent, signifi-
cant recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court as well As
of the Montana Supreme Court are considered.
II. CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS
A. Introduction
This portion of the survey will examine five Montana deci-
sions' and one United States Supreme Court decision" which con-
sider the constitutional validity of confessions. Questions regarding
confessions generally arise within the context of suppression hear-
ings. These issues come before the Montana Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court as part of an appeal from a lower
court decision either granting or denying a motion to suppress.
The state has a statutory right of appeal from an order suppressing
a confession, admission, or other evidence.5 A defendant, on the
other hand, may only appeal from an order denying his motion to
suppress after final judgment has been entered.6 The primary focus
of these appeals is whether the confession or admission is admissi-
ble into evidence or, conversely, whether it should be excluded.
There are essentially five different tests of admissibility of
confessions in Montana and a confession must pass each of them
before it may be admitted into evidence. First, it must be "volun-
1. Ranney, Presumptions in Criminal Cases: A New Look at an Old Problem, 41
MONT. L. REV. 21 (1980); Civil Procedure and Evidence Survey, 41 MONT. L. REV. 293 (1980)
(polygraph evidence; corroboration of accomplice testimony; other crimes evidence); Note,
41 MONT. L. REV. 281 (1980) (probable cause for issuance of search warrant).
2. Foremost among the legislative developments was the Montana Legislature's aboli-
tion of the insanity defense. A consideration of the legislative changes, their validity and
effect, is beyond the scope of a survey of recent case law developments. The topic is deserv-
ing of separate consideration.
3. State v. Allies, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043 (1979); State v. Blakney, - Mont.
-, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979); State v. Dess, - Mont. ., 602 P.2d 142 (1979); State v.
Grimestad, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198 (1979); State v. Ryan, - Mont. - , 595 P.2d
1146 (1979).
4. Dunaway v. New York, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979).
5. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 46-20-103 (1979).
6. MCA § 46-20-104 (1979).
330 [Vol. 41
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tary" in the legal sense of the word. Secondly, it may not violate
the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona' and its progeny. Thirdly,
the confession may not be a result of an unnecessary delay in
presenting an accused before an examining magistrate.9 Fourthly,
the confession may not be the fruit of other illegal police proce-
dure. 10 And finally, there must be some proof that an offense was
committed other than the confession itself." This section of the
survey will examine the test of voluntariness in Montana with
some specificity and the other tests of admissibility to the extent
that developments have occurred within the period covered by the
survey. It will also examine the rules governing the presentation of
evidence in a suppression hearing and the scope of review in light
of recent Montana decisions and relevant decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
B. Voluntariness-Totality of the Circumstances
1. Voluntary-A Term of Art
Voluntariness is frequently stated to be "the underlying test of
7. See notes 12 through 120 infra and accompanying text.
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. In State v. Benbo, 174 Mont. 252, 570 P.2d 894 (1977), Montana adopted the
equivalent of the federal McNabb-Mallory rule (see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)). The rule in Montana is based
upon MCA § 46-7-101 (1979), which requires that an arrested person be presented without
unnecessary delay before a judge for his initial appearance, and MCA § 46-7-102 (1979),
which sets forth the duties of the judge at the initial appearance. The Montana rule was
outlined in Benbo as follows:
Henceforth, the effect of a failure to take a person before a judge without unneces-
sary delay after his arrest is to be determined as follows: When a defendant bases
a motion to suppress evidence upon a claim that he was not provided a prompt
initial appearance, the burden is first on the defendant to show the delay was
unnecessary. The district court should focus on the diligence of the persons who
made the arrest in bringing the defendant before the nearest and most accessible
judge. While the length of the time between arrest and initial appearance is not
determinative of the "necessity" of the delay, it is a factor to be considered.
Once a defendant has established the delay was unnecessary, the burden
shifts to the prosecution. The state must show the evidence obtained during the
delay was not reasonably related to the delay. Absent such a showing the evidence
will be excluded.
174 Mont. at 262, 570 P.2d at 900. There are no cases within the period of this survey which
deal with this particular rule of admissibility. It will not, therefore, receive any further
discussion.
10. See notes 142 through 144 infra and accompanying text.
11. This is the so-called corpus delicti rule. There are no decisions under #his rule
within the period of this survey. It will not, therefore, receive any further discussion. See
State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont. 19, 105 P.2d 679 (1940); State v. Traufer, 109 Mont. 275, 97
P.2d 336 (1939); State v. Clark, 102 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276 (1936); State v. Dixson, 80
Mont. 181, 260 P. 138 (1927); State v. Smith, 65 Mont. 458, 211 P. 208 (1922).
3
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admissibility of statements, admissions, or confessions."" "Volun-
tariness," as used in this legal sense, has acquired a meaning much
different from that attributed to the word in everyday usage. It has
become a legal term of art, a shorthand expression for the complex
of fundamental values underlying the prohibition against the use
of confessions obtained illegally. 3
Whether a statement or confession was voluntarily made has
been frequently said to turn on the "totality of the circumstances"
of the particular case." The next three subsections of this survey
will examine three different aspects of the "totality of the circum-
stances" test. In evaluating a case under this test, the trial court
must determine (1) whether promises, threats, or an inherently
coercive atmosphere of the interrogation rendered the statements
untrustworthy; (2) whether the conduct of the police under the cir-
cumstances of the case overpowered the will of the accused to re-
sist or was so reprehensible as to require exclusion; and (3)
whether the statements, although neither induced nor coerced by
any misconduct on the part of the police, were truly the product of
a rational intellect and a free and unrestrained will.
12. State v. Lenon, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 901, 906 (1977); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 604 (1975).
13. 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 826 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) ("[T]he term 'voluntary' is a
word of art which should not be taken in any lay or colloquial sense . . . . [I]n its legal
sense the term is a compendious expression intended to indicate in summary form multiple
factors of legal significance. These factors embrace a wide range or complex of values which
modern confession law considers and which that law seeks to maximize."); Blackburn v.
Alabama., 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) ("[A] complex of values underlies the stricture against
use by the state of a confession which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms
involuntary, and the role played by each in any situation varies according to the particular
circumstances of the case."); People v. Sigal, 221 Cal. App. 2d 684, 696, 34 Cal. Rptr. 767,
775 (1963) ("In weighing confession admissibility, the courts have continued to use the ter-
minology of human volition, while basing their decisions in large part upon the acceptability
of police conduct. Due process thus invests the word 'voluntary' with connotations far
broader than dictionary definitions. Preservation of freedom of the will is only one of several
interests at stake. Another interest is the courts' rejection of confessions produced by illegal
police action. The notion of an involuntary confession has become a 'convenient shorthand'
for describing a complex of values which underlies the determination of admissibility.");
A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 167 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) ("[Tlhe
concept of involuntariness seems to be used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to prac-
tices which are repellant to civilized standards of decency or which, under the circum-
stances, are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs
his capacity for rational choice." Quoted in 3 WIGMORF ON EVIDENCE § 826 (Chadbourn rev.
1970)). , ,
14. NFrazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480
(1969); State v. Blakney, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1979); State v. Grimestad,
Mont..., 598 P.2d 198, 202 (1979); State v. Lenon, 174 Mont. 264, 271, 570 P.2d
901, 906 (1977).
4
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2. Three Facets of the Voluntariness Test
a. Trustworthiness
At common law a confession which was found to be untrust-
worthy was deemed involuntary and inadmissible. 5 If the promise
or threat prompting the confession was adjudged to be an induce-
ment which would lead a reasonable man to confess with complete
disregard for the truth, the confession was untrustworthy and ex-
cluded.' This was essentially the test enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the 1884 case of Hopt v. Utah.1 7 The
Court there noted the generally accepted view that although con-
fession evidence must be subjected to careful scrutiny and received
with caution, a voluntary confession of guilt was among the strong-
est forms of evidence.18 The Court pointed out that great weight
was given to such evidence because it was presumed that one who
was innocent would not imperil his safety or prejudice his interest
by an untrue statement. This presumption ceased to exist, how-
ever, when the confession was made because of a threat or promise
which operated upon the fears or hopes of the accused, depriving
him of "that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his
confession voluntary within the meaning of the law."' 19
Until at least 1952, the Montana Supreme Court used this
common law test as the sole criterion by which the voluntariness of
a confession was determined.2 0 The Montana court would only ex-
clude a confession if it were shown to have been prompted by some
inducement sufficient to cause a reasonable person to confess re-
gardless of the truth of his statement.2 The court's rejection of
such "involuntary" confessions was based upon "the unreliability
of such testimony-the probability of the statements being un-
true. '22 The object of the rule, according to the court, was not to
exclude a confession that was truthful, but to avoid the possibility
of a confession of guilt being used against one who was in fact
15. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 511 (4th ed.
1974); see also 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 822(a) (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
16. Id.
17. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
18. Id. at 584-85.
19. Id. at 585.
20. In State v. Robuck, 126 Mont. 302, 308-09, 248 P.2d 817, 820 (1952), the Montana
court held that the "test applied in determining whether a confession is voluntary and hence
admissible is, 'Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair
risk of a false confession?'" Citing State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981 (1907), which
first established that rule for Montana.
21. State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 520, 90 P. 981, 983 (1907).
22. Id.
19801
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innocent.2
The common law test utilized by the Montana court had also
been utilized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in the case of
Rogers v. Richmond.24 Upon review, the Supreme Court held that
a legal standard which gives decisive weight to the probable truth
or falsity of a confession violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25 In so holding, the Supreme Court
pointed out that it is not unreliability which renders a confession
involuntary, but rather the fact that the confession was the prod-
uct of coercion, either physical or psychological. 6 Such confessions
are offensive to the due process clause because "the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisi-
torial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by
evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coer-
cion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth."' 7
This decision clearly set a new emphasis in evaluating the volunta-
riness of confessions. Courts were no longer to look to the reason-
able man and the probable trustworthiness of his statements, but
rather to the conduct of law enforcement officials and its probable
tendency to overbear the accused's will to resist.28 The trustworthi-
ness test was not completely rejected. It simply could no longer
serve as the sole criterion by which voluntariness was determined.
The Montana Supreme Court, in State v. White,2 9 expressly
retreated from the trustworthiness rationale of its earlier decisions
and, in reliance on Jackson v. Denno3 0 required a determination
of voluntariness not influenced by the truth or falsity of the state-
ments made.3 1 The court's position in this regard became some-
what uncertain, however, when, in State v. Lenon 2 the court eval-
uated the voluntariness of the defendant's confession by analyzing
whether the totality of the circumstances was such as to overbear
the defendant's will and create any fair risk of a false confession, 3
23. Id.
24. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
25. Id. at 543.
26. Id. at 540.
27. Id. at 540-41.
28. Id. at 544. See generally Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Sys-
tems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (1959) and Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954).
29. 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966).
30. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
31. 146 Mont. 226, 235, 405 P.2d 761, 766 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966).
32. __ Mont. - , 570 P.2d 901 (1977).
33. Id. at - , 570 P.2d at 906.
[Vol. 41
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citing pre-White decisions"' as authority. The court has since clari-
fied its position and returned to that taken in White in the recent
decision of State v. Allies"5 in which it recognized that the use of
an involuntary confession, whether true or false, violates both the
guarantee against self-incrimination and the right to due process of
law.30
b. Police Practices
(1) The Constitutional Perspective
Rogers v. Richmond37 was not the first decision of the Su-
preme Court which found that the methods used by law enforce-
ment officers to extract a confession from an accused were incom-
patible with the constitutional requirements of due process. Some
twenty-five years earlier the Supreme Court first found a state
court conviction to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause because it was procured through the use of an
involuntary confession. In Brown v. Mississippi,38 it was undis-
puted, even in the state court, that extreme brutality 9 had been
used to extract the confessions from the defendants, that provided
the primary evidence upon which their convictions were based.
The Supreme Court declared the methods used "revolting to the
sense of justice" and held the use of confessions obtained through
violence as the basis for a conviction to be a clear denial of due
process.' 0
34. State v. Robuck, 126 Mont. 302, 248 P.2d 817 (1952); State v. Sherman, 35 Mont.
512, 90 P. 981 (1907).
35. __ Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043, 1049 (1979). In that decision, the court pointed
out that involuntary confessions were excluded historically because they were felt to be un-
trustworthy. Conceding that that rationale might retain some vitality, the court asserted
that it is no longer acceptable as the sole reason for the exclusion of an involuntary
confession.
36. Id., citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542 (1897) for the proposition that the use of an involuntary confession violates the
guarantee against self-incrimination and Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) for
the proposition that it violates due process.
37. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
38. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
39. One defendant was taken by a deputy sheriff to the house of the deceased where a
mob of white men accused him of the crime, hung him from the limb of a tree, and whipped
him with a rope. The next day the deputy arrested him and before taking him to jail se-
verely whipped him telling him the whipping would continue until he confessed to a state-
ment the deputy would dictate. The other two defendants were arrested, taken to jail,
forced to strip, laid across a chair, and beaten with leather belts with the straps and buckles
cutting into their backs. They too were told that the whipping would continue until they
confessed.
40. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
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Post-Brown decisions"' demonstrate that the voluntariness of
statements made by an accused can be vitiated as easily by psy-
chological coercion as by physical violence. 2 As the Court stated in
Watts v. Indiana,"s "There is torture of mind as well as body; the
will is as much affected by fear as by force. '4 4 A confession which
is "the product of sustained pressure by the police" is not volun-
tary: "When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is imma-
terial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental
ordeal. '45 Brown and its progeny thus provide a line of authority
for the proposition that it is a violation of due process under both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to convict a defendant on
41. See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
42. Numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court reflect this recognition
that the use of subtle psychological pressures brought to bear upon an accused can accom-
plish behind the closed door of the interrogation room exactly what the Constitution prohib-
its, that is, "make a suspect the unwilling collaborator in establishing his guilt. This [the
police] may accomplish not only with ropes and a rubber hose, not only by relay questioning
persistently, insistently subjugating a tired mind, but by subtler devices." Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). While conceding the
authorized role of interrogation in protecting society from criminals, Justice Frankfurter
also pointed out that the very atmosphere of custodial interrogation can be utilized to com-
pel an accused to convict himself:
Since under the procedures of Anglo-American criminal justice [persons suspected
of crime] cannot be constrained by legal process to give answers which incriminate
them, the police have resorted to other means to unbend their reluctance, lest
criminal investigation founder. Kindness, cajolery, entreaty, deception, persistent
cross-questioning, even physical brutality have been used to this end. In the
United States, "interrogation" has become a police technique, and detention for
purposes of interrogation a common, although generally unlawful, practice. Crime
detection officials, finding that if their suspects are kept under tight police control
during questioning they are less likely to be distracted, less likely to be recalci-
trant and, of course, less likely to make off and escape entirely, not infrequently
take such suspects into custody for "investigation."
In the police station a prisoner is surrounded by known hostile forces. He is dis-
oriented from the world he knows and in which he finds support. He is subject to
coercing impingements, undermining even if not obvious pressures of every vari-
ety. In such an atmosphere, questioning that is long continued-even if it is only
repeated at intervals, never protracted to the point of physical exhaustion -inevi-
tably suggests that, the questioner has a right to, and expects, an answer. This is
so, certainly, when the prisoner has never been told that he need not answer and
when, because his commitment to custody seems to be at the will of his question-
ers, he has every reason to believe that he will be held and interrogated until he
speaks.
Id. at 571-76 [footnotes omitted].
43. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 53.
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the basis of a confession obtained by means of physical violence or
psychological coercion. As this line of decisions developed, the
Court recognized that law enforcement officers became more aware
of the burden which they shared in protecting the fundamental
rights of citizens, including those citizens suspected of crime. 4" But
as police officers became more responsible, the methods used to
extract confessions became more sophisticated and the task of the
Court in enforcing federal constitutional protections became more
difficult because of the "delicate judgments to be made" in evalu-
ating the question of voluntariness and due process of law under
the "totality of the circumstances" of a particular case.47
Three different tasks or concerns of the Court have focused its
attention on the methods used by law enforcement officers to ex-
tract a confession from an accused. The court has the role of (1)
protecting the individual accused by prohibiting police violation of
his constitutionally guaranteed rights; (2) protecting society by re-
quiring that those who enforce the law also obey it; and (3) pro-
tecting the integrity of an accusatorial system of justice by requir-
ing society to bear the burden of proving the charge against an
accused and by refusing to allow society to compel him to convict
himself.
In its role as protector of the individual, the Court recognized
an inherent conflict between society's interest in prompt and effi-
cient law enforcement and its interest in preventing the rights of
its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional
methods of law enforcement."' Enforcement of the law, though im-
portant, could not be allowed to compromise either an individual's
constitutionally guaranteed rights or other values considered fun-
damental to our system of government. The aim of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirement is to prevent fundamental
unfairness to an accused in the use of evidence," that is, to protect
an accused's right to a fair trial. Both the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination"0 and the Sixth Amendment right of
assistance of counsel51 are included in the Fourteenth Amendment
46. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 315.
49. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Coerced confessions offend the
community's sense of fair play and decency."); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941).
50. U.S. CONST. amend V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... "
51. U.S. CONST. amend VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
19801 337
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due process guarantee.62 Confessions obtained in violation of either
of these two rights, are, therefore, dubbed "involuntary," under the
police practices rationale. To preserve their viability and hence the
defendant's right to a fair trial, it became necessary to extend the
protection of these two guarantees to various stages of pretrial con-
tact between law enforcement officials and the accused.53 It makes
little sense for the Court to assiduously guard against fundamental
unfairness within the courtroom while allowing the same unfair-
ness to be exploited outside of the courtroom as a means of gather-
ing evidence to be used against the accused at trial."
In its role as protector of society, the Court was intent upon
requiring that the police obey the law while enforcing it, realizing
that "in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves."5 Finally, the Court has as-
serted a need to maintain the integrity of our accusatorial system
of justice.56 In an accusatorial, in contrast to an inquisitorial, sys-
tem of law, "society carries the burden of proving its charge
52. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) made the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) made the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to
the states and required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) extended the holding in Gideon to all criminal
prosecutions, however minor, that actually result in imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, -
U.S. ., 99 S.Ct. 1158 (1979) held that no indigent criminal defendant may be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to appointed counsel.
53. In the Sixth Amendment context, the right to counsel has been extended to those
stages of a formal criminal prosecution (Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)) which are
"critical" (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)) and involve a "trial-like confronta-
tion" (United States v. Ash, 412 U.S. 300 (1973)). See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970) (preliminary examination); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineups).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) clearly held that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation applies to custodial interrogation situations.
54. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941).
55. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
56. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
540-41 (1961). But see, Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
VA. L. REv. 859, 913 (1979):
The police, with society's approval, seek to obtain the truth from a suspect, who,
if guilty, has nothing to gain and much to lose from giving the police what they
want. By its very nature, therefore, police interrogation has inquisitional attrib-
utes, and we do not advance our analysis by asserting that ours is an adversary or
accusatorial system. To start with such an assertion is to conclude in advance that
police interrogation, at least as we have known it, should not exist.
Professor Grano suggests that police interrogation, though inquisitorial by nature, is neces-
sary and authorized in our society and that due process does not require equality of knowl-
edge and sophistication between the police and criminal suspects since such an equality
would effectively eliminate all confessions. He suggests that due process simply prohibits
undue advantage from being taken of a defendant by police. Id. at 909-19.
10
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against the accused[;] [i]t must establish its case, not by interroga-
tion of the accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation. ' 57 In any one
case, any one of these concerns may dominate and a confession
may be excluded under the due process clause because to allow its
inclusion would be fundamentally unfair, would amount to ap-
proval of illegal police conduct, or would subvert our accusatorial
system of justice.
Under this "police practices" evaluation, the underlying test of
admissibility remains "voluntariness," 8 and "voluntariness" is a
function of the "totality of the circumstances. '59 A discussion of
"significant" police practices within this analysis must be ap-
proached with caution because it is not generally the presence of
any particular practice which is dispositive,6° but rather the combi-
nation or eggregious nature of those practices found to be present.
Strict guidelines are both elusive and illusory in the confessions
context, as has been pointed out in the search and seizure con-
text. 1 The courts have been reluctant to enunciate hard and fast
rules which may prove inadequate to deal with new modes of coer-
cion that may emerge from the "perpetual Pandora's box"6 of po-
lice practices." A brief overview of the numerous practices found
to be coercive can be useful in ascertaining the limitations imposed
by the constitutional requirement that confessions, to be admissi-
ble, be "voluntary."
57. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). The Court cited 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, C. 46, § 34 (8th ed. 1824) as authority: "The law will not suffer a prisoner to be
made the deluded instrument of his own conviction."
58. See note 12 supra.
59. See note 14 supra.
60. State v. Grimestad, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198, 202 (1979); State v. Lenon,
- Mont. -, 570 P.2d 901, 906 (1977).
61. See notes 428-30 infra and accompanying texts.
62. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 387
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam, Perspectives].
63. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality
opinion):
It is impossible for this Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to at-
tempt precisely to delimit or to surround with specific, all-inclusive restrictions,
the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining
confessions. No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interro-
gation has been evolved .... The ultimate test remains that which has been the
only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the
test of voluntariness. Is the confession a product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker? If it is, he has willed to confess, and it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process
[citation omitted].
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Detention, especially prolonged detention,' is often held to be
coercive. Protracted interrogation, whether subjecting the accused
to lengthy questioning sessions,6" to day-and-night sessions,a6 to a
continual stream of questioning by relays of officers, '67 to question-
ing by groups of officers,6 or simply to sporadic interrogation ses-
sions over a number of days, 9 is also potentially coercive. The
place of detention or interrogation7 0 can be significant in determin-
ing voluntariness as can the fact that the accused was deprived of
necessities, such as food1 ' or sleep.72 Similarly, efforts to isolate an
accused by, for example, holding him incommunicado7 3 and deny-
64. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966);
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940).
65. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (six and seven hour sessions); Blackburn v. Ala-
bama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (eight to nine hours); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)
(eight hours); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (eight and fourteen hour sessions); Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (five nights); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943) (36
hours); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (numerous four to five and one-half
hour sessions); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (five days of intensive interrogation
culminating in all night session).
66. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 332 U.S. 143 (1943); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940).
67. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943).
68. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
69. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
70. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (defendant-inmate kept for fourteen days in
small punishment cell which had no bed, no windows, and a hole in the floor which served
as a toilet); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (defendant held for sixteen days in
small cell with no windows); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant ques-
tioned for eight to nine hours in six by eight foot room with as many as three officers pre-
sent); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (defendant questioned in six by ten foot
room by officers who had to work in relays to permit them some relief from the stifling
heat); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 59 (1949) (two days of solitary confinement in cell aptly
called "the hole"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943) (defendant kept at table in
homicide investigating office with electric light over his head for thirty-six hours of
questioning).
71. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis
v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Payne v. Arkan-
sas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
72. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1943); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
73. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (accused in pain and shock in hospital,
isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (held
incommunicado for nine days); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (held incommu-
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ing friends and relatives or his attorney access to him74 are de-
nounced as coercive violations of the accused's constitutional rights
under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Police are
generally required by statute to bring an accused before a judicial
magistrate without unnecessary delay.7 s Frequent violations of the
statute in an effort to obtain incriminating statements or evidence
from an accused have resulted in a court-imposed exclusionary rule
in some jurisdictions mandating exclusion of all statements or evi-
dence obtained in the interim.7 1 Such delays are in any event gen-
erally held to weigh against the voluntariness of the procured ad-
missions.7 Additionally, since 1966, failure to advise an accused
subjected to custodial interrogation of his constitutional rights to
consult with counsel and to remain silent results in automatic ex-
clusion of statements obtained.7 8 Even before the decision of Mi-
nicado sixteen days); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (held incommunicado five
to seven days); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (incommunicado five days); Reck v.
Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (incommunicado four days); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961) (request for counsel denied because illiterate defendant could not give officer name of
attorney to call); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (repeated request to consult with
counsel denied); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (held incommunicado three days);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (taken to prison eighty miles away from home, held
incommunicado three days); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (held incommunicado six
days); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (held incommunicado five days); Turner
v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (held incommunicado five days and nights); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (held incommunicado five days); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945) (held incommunicado four days); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (held
incommunicado five days). The fact that an accused is allowed to visit with family and
friends militates against a finding of involuntariness. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596
(1944).
74. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (mother denied permission to see defen-
dant); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (father denied permission to see defendant); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (family denied permission to see defendant); Fikes v. Ala-
bama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (father and lawyer denied permission to see defendant); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (mother and lawyer denied permission to see defendant).
75. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-43 n. 7 (1943) in which the Court
enumerated statutes enacted in nearly every state requiring that arrested persons be
promptly taken before a committing authority. In Montana, the statutory requirement is
currently codified at MCA § 46-7-101 (1979).
76. See note 9 supra.
77. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Turner v. Penn-
sylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940). The exclusionary rule which the United States Supreme Court adopted in United
States v. McNabb, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the
federal courts, has never been imposed upon the state as a constitutional requirement of due
process. See note 9 supra. See also Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1735, 1747 (1957); Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951).
78. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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randa v. Arizona,79 however, the Supreme Court held in numerous
decisions that a failure to so advise a defendant was a significant
factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession."
Other aspects of police conduct which pertain to voluntariness
include the use of threats of harm against the accused or those
close to him,81 suggestions or promises of leniency, 82 dictation of a
confession by police,83 and the use of deceit or trickery.84 The list
of practices might well be expanded by specific circumstances pre-
sent in a particular case. The period prior to arraignment is the
period in which the rights of the accused are generally least pro-
tected. It is a period which lends itself to "secret inquisitional
processes" which render a confession suspect and less likely to be
voluntary.8 5
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966);
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Harris
v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
81. Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (defendant told state aid to her infant chil-
dren would be cut off and her children taken from her unless she cooperated); Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961) (defendant placed on exhibition before over one hundred people); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (threat of mob violence); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945) (defendant stripped and kept naked for three hours then allowed to put on only
shoes, socks, underwear and a blanket until he confessed); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940) (continual threats and physical mistreatment denounced by the Court, although
not dispositive in decision because evidence on that point was conflicting).
82. Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (promise to recommend leniency); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ("it'll go easier on you").
83. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (confession composed by deputy sheriff
on basis of defendant's answers to questions); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (con-
fession in question-and-answer form based on leading questions from prosecutor); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (first confessions rejected, interrogation continued until "bet-
ter" confession obtained); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions dictated).
84. (a) Defendant told accomplices had confessed: Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969) (denounced but held insufficient to hold confession involuntary); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948) (defendant shown alleged confession of accomplice); Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219 (1941) (denounced but held insufficient to render confession involuntary).
(b) Use of friends to work on defendant's sympathies: Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961) (business partner); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (officer, a child-
hood friend, claimed job and family security in jeopardy if defendant did not confess); Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (defendant's wife brought in to help get defendant to confess).
(c) Use of psychiatrist to interrogate defendant while posing as medical doctor: Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
(d) Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (use of prayer by officer). See gener-
ally Dix, Mistakes, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275 (1975); Annot. 99 A.L.R.2d 772 (1965).
85. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1962).
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(2) Police Practices and Montana Case Law
The "trustworthiness" test was the sole test of voluntariness
utilized by the Montana Supreme Court in confession cases until
that test was held insufficient under the due process clause by the
United States Supreme Court. 6 In State v. White,87 the Montana
court looked for the first time to the confession cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court for constitutionally mandated
standards of voluntariness. The defendant was a sixteen-year-old
boy who, after two to three hours of police interrogation, confessed
to a murder committed with an axe in the course of a burglary.
The defendant claimed the confession upon which his conviction
was based had been involuntarily given. The Montana court re-
viewed the United States Supreme Court decisions which had held
the admission of a confession into evidence in state courts to be
violative of due process. After reviewing those cases, the court
found no reprehensible police conduct equivalent to that de-
nounced in the decisions of the Supreme Court and so held the
confession to have been voluntarily given. This decision did estab-
lish that the Montana court was cognizant of the "police practices"
voluntariness test. The court's awareness of the duty to apply the
test became more apparent in State v. Smith,8 in which the court
held, "when a motion to suppress is presented to a trial court, its
analysis of the evidence. . . must focus on whether impermissible
procedures were followed by law enforcement authorities." 89
Three recent Montana decisions demonstrate the court's grow-
ing concern with the application of the voluntariness test.90 In
State v. Blakney91 the court acknowledged the need to examine
police conduct in determining the voluntariness of a confession,
but found no impermissible police conduct present. In State v.
Grimestad92 the supreme court affirmed the granting of defen-
dant's motion to suppress. The court pointed to various police
practices providing substantial support for the trial court's finding
of involuntariness, including repeated assurances by the officers
that the defendant was not a suspect, continual suggestions by the
officers as to how the shooting had to have happened, the addition
86. See notes 15-36 and accompanying text infra.
87. 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966).
88. 164 Mont. 334, 523 P.2d 1395 (1975).
89. Id. at 338, 523 P.2d at 1397.
90. State v. Allies, - Mont. - , 606 P.2d 1043 (1979); State v. Blakney, -
Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979); State v. Grimestad, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198
(1979).
91. - Mont.. , 598 P.2d 198 (1979).
92. - Mont. 605 P.2d 1093 (1979).
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of a sentence to the defendant's statement at the request of an
officer, and a threat of incarceration at Warm Springs, the state
mental hospital.
A similar concern for unfair and illegal police practices is evi-
dent in State v. Allies,93 in which the court reversed the conviction
of the defendant for the heinous drug-related killing of a family of
four. The defendant was subjected to psychological forms of coer-
cion which rendered his confession involuntary." Many of the po-
lice tactics used had been earlier denounced by the Supreme Court
in Miranda: "keeping the suspect incommunicado in a small room;
isolating the suspect in a hostile police environment; the mean cop-
nice cop interrogation technique; and, the guilt assumption tech-
nique of interrogation." 95 Additionally, the police in Allies used a
truth serum to obtain a confession in direct contravention of the
defendant's right to counsel. 6
The Montana court's strong disapproval of practices already
held to be coercive by the United States Supreme Court was to be
expected. Of greater significance perhaps is the court's vigorous de-
nunciation of the use of police deception to secure a confession. In
Allies, police officers lied to the defendant leading him to believe
that they knew much less than they did about his involvement in
the crimes and tried to convince him that his problem was medical
or psychiatric rather than criminal.97 This deception was said to be
"particularly repulsive to and totally incompatible with the con-
cepts of due process embedded in the federal and state constitu-
tions."' s Unlike earlier decisions which had permitted police de-
ception with little or only mild disapproval,99 the court's holding in
93. - Mont. - , 606 P.2d 1043 (1979).
94. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 1050.
95. Id.
96. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 1051.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. State v. Rossell, 113 Mont. 457, 465-66, 127 P.2d 379, 382-83 (1942) (false state-
ments of officers regarding the non-existence of evidence which would support defendant's
claim of ownership held insufficient to require finding of involuntariness); State v. Robuck,
126 Mont. 302, 309-10, 248 P.2d 817, 820 (1952) (fact that officer did make false statements
to the accused regarding her family would not make confession later obtained inadmissible);
State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 234, 405 P.2d 761, 765 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023
(1966) (misinformation regarding evidence incriminating defendant "did not bring any un-
due pressure to bear on the defendant, and the fact that he may have suffered a slip of the
tongue [incriminating himself] does not establish coercion"). In State v. Lenon, 174 Mont.
264, 272, 570 P.2d 901, 906 (1977) the court said, "We cannot overemphasize our strong
condemnation of police practices . . . wherein a police officer misinforms a defendant as to
other arrestees having given confessions ... ," but held that the deception used was insuffi-
cient to render the confession involuntary.
344 [Vol. 41
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Allies may indicate that deceptive practices in themselves could
require reversal.100 American courts have traditionally disapproved
of police deception, but have seldom found it sufficient to render a
confession involuntary absent other coercive factors. 101
c. Product of a Rational Intellect and Free Will102
In Blackburn v. Alabama,10 3 the Supreme Court focused on a
third aspect of the voluntariness test: to be "voluntary" a confes-
sion must be "the product of a rational intellect and a free will. '"104
In Blackburn, the defendant was mentally ill. To incarcerate a
human being upon the basis of a statement he made while insane
would, according to the Court, affront a basic sense of justice in-
herent in our constitutional system. 05 This facet of the voluntari-
ness test can be closely related to the police practices aspect of the
test since police practices might well determine whether a state-
ment made by an accused while in police custody was, in fact, the
product of "an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker."'" Other characteristics of the particular accused may,
however, make him more susceptible to police pressure or totally
unable to make a rational choice to confess or remain silent. The
"circumstances of pressure" must be weighed "against the power of
resistance of the person confessing. 10 7 This requires an individual-
ized case-by-case analysis because "[w]hat would be overpowering
to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an
experienced criminal."'0 " An accused's subnormal intelligence'" or
100. See also State v. Grimestad, - Mont. - , 598 P.2d 1146 (1979) in which a
police statement to the defendant that he was not a suspect and that he need not be con-
cerned about his Miranda rights was denounced as deceptive and contributing to an invol-
untary confession.
101. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) and Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See generally Dix, Mistake, Ignorance,
Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 275, 300-
25 (1974) and Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 772 (1965).
102. See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
VA. L. Rav. 859, 868-80 (1959).
103. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
104. Id. at 208.
105. Id. at 207.
106. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality
opinion).
107. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
108. Id. at 197-98.
109. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (minor); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961) (mentally retarded); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (mentally dull); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (low mentality).
17
Johnson and Joyce Johnson: Criminal Procedure
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1980
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
lack of education, °10 mental illness' or physical condition,"1 in-
cluding the influence of drugs or alcohol," 3 have been held to be
factors which can make him more susceptible than the average
adult to pressures designed to extract a confession from him. Chil-
dren, by virtue of their age " 4 and inexperience,' are presumed to
be more likely to yield to police coercion.
Courts do not generally delineate their voluntariness analysis
into the three categories of trustworthiness, police conduct, and
personal traits of the accused. These three facets of the test are
nevertheless clearly discernible. Two recent Montana cases" 6 deal
with this third facet of the test. In State v. Blakney,17 the court
looked at an extensive list of factors which other courts had found
relevant to a determination of the voluntariness of statements
made by a youthful defendant," 8 and held Blakney's confession to
110. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (fifth grade education); Davis v. North Caro-
lina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (third or fourth grade); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961) (illiterate); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (one and one-half years high
school); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (fifth grade education); Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191 (1957) (third grade); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (illiterate);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (ignorant).
111. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (insane); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) (history of emotional instability); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957)
(schizophrenic).
112. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (defendant was interrogated while in hos-
pital bed with tubes, catheter, and intravenous feeding devices attached to his body; lapsed
into unconsciousness periodically; weakened by pain and shock); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S.
707 (1967) (appeared ill); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (suffering from bullet
wound which resulted in leg amputation); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (ill, vomiting
blood).
113. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (interrogated shortly after drugs were ad-
ministered to alleviate pain of bullet wound); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (suffering
withdrawal pains of narcotic addiction).
114. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (fourteen-year-old boy); Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961) (nineteen-year-old boy); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (fifteen-
year-old boy).
115. United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958
(1971).
116. State v. Allies, - Mont. - , 606 P.2d 1043 (1979); State v. Blakney, -
Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979).
117. __ Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979).
118. Id. at - , 605 P.2d at 1096. The factors the court considered included (1) the
age of the accused; (2) the education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to the
substance of the charge and his constitutional rights; (4) whether the accused was held in-
communicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (5) whether the
accused was interrogated; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogation; (8)
whether the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; (9) whether
the accused repudiated an extrajudicial statement at a later date; (10) mental capacity of
the accused; (11) the use of polygraph examinations; and (12) the accused's prior experience
with the criminal justice system and in the adult world.
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be voluntary. In State v. Allies,119 the court based its ultimate
holding that the statements were involuntary on prohibited police
practices. In relating the facts of the case, however, the court also
pointed out that the defendant did not seem to be in control of his
faculties much of the time because he was under the influence of a
large quantity of drugs and was suffering from narcotic withdrawal
pains. The coercive factors suggesting involuntariness were so nu-
merous that the court did not dwell on the accused's drugged state
and its effect on the voluntariness of the statements made. The
Supreme Court has held, however, that the standards which render
a confession inadmissible if it is the product of physical intimida-
tion or psychological pressure are "equally applicable to a drug-
induced state.' 20
In summary, then, the legal test of voluntariness will render a
confession inadmissible if it was procured under circumstances
which render it untrustworthy, if the methods used by police to
extract the confession require its suppression, or if personal traits
or the condition of the accused make it evident that the statements
were not the product of a rational intellect and free will. Recent
Montana cases have been particularly attentive to the police prac-
tices used to obtain a confession and strongly denounce the use of
deception as well as other methods designed to take unfair advan-
tage of an accused.
C. Other Recent Developments
This subsection of the survey on the law of confessions will
focus on the significance of recent Montana decisions without pro-
viding any extensive background to the particular area.
1. Volunteered Statements
In State v. Ryan, 2 ' police officers came to the defendant's
home to execute a search warrant for guns the defendant had re-
ported as stolen and for which the defendant had collected insur-
ance proceeds. Upon seeing the officers, the defendant said that
they had caught him and he showed them where the guns were. As
the police were checking the serial numbers, he told them he had
altered the numbers after reporting the guns stolen. The trial court
held the statement inadmissible because Miranda warnings had
not been given. The supreme court reversed, however, holding the
119. - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043 (1979).
120. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963).
121. - Mont. -, 595 P.2d at 1146 (1979).
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statements to have been volunteered. Volunteered statements are
not brought about by police questioning and are both voluntary
and admissible.12 As the Miranda Court had held, "Volunteered
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. "123
2. Miranda Violations
Four recent Montana cases deal with Miranda-related is-
sues. 1 4 Ryan " simply held that volunteered statements are not
affected by the requirements of Miranda; where police do not
question an accused or in any way solicit his statements, the re-
quirements of Miranda are not applicable. Both State v. Dess
12 6
and State v. Grimestad2 " dealt with the adequacy of the Miranda
warning given by police. In Dess the officers told the defendant,
"We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed
for you, if and when you go to court." '28 The court recognized a
split in authority as to the validity of a warning containing similar
language.129 Those upholding the warning as valid under Miranda
found that "the only conclusion a defendant given the warning
would be justified in reaching was that '. . . since he was clearly
entitled to have a lawyer present during the questioning and since
no lawyer could be provided, he could not be questioned.' "130 The
Montana court, however, adopted the reasoning of those courts
which had held the warning inadequate.13 1 Such a warning is
"equivocal and ambiguous, informing a defendant of the right to
counsel in one breath and telling him counsel cannot be provided
in the next."3 2 An effective and express explanation of the right to
appointed counsel is required by Miranda.133 The court viewed the
warning as misleading and confusing and as constituting "a subtle
122. Id. at -, 595 P.2d at 1149.
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966), quoted in State v. Ryan, -
Mont. -, 595 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1979).
124. State v. Blakney, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979); State v. Dess, -
Mont. -, 602 P.2d 142 (1979); State v. Grimestad, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198 (1979);
State v. Ryan, - Mont. -, 595 P.2d 1146 (1979).
125. __ Mont. -, 595 P.2d 1146 (1979).
126. - Mont. 602 P.2d 142 (1979).
127. - Mont. 598 P.2d 198 (1979).
128. - Mont. 602 P.2d 142, 144 (1979).
129. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 145.
130. Id., quoting Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1174 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973).
131. State v. Dess, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 142, 145 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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temptation to the unsophisticated indigent to forego the right to
counsel."' 34
In State v. Grimestad, it was not the language of the warning
that was challenged, but rather the manner in which it was given.
Officers told the defendant that he was not a suspect, but they had
to give the warning to everyone and obtain a waiver as a matter of
procedure. " This "downplaying of defendant's Miranda rights
and the continued assurances by the investigating officers that he
was not a suspect of a crime" were held to support the trial court's
holding that mere lip service was given to the Miranda require-
ments, rather than a meaningful warning.' 3 6 The absence of a
proper warning, as well as other improper police conduct, rendered
the defendant's statements inadmissible at trial. 3 7
State v. Blakney,3 8 like Dess, resolved a question in Montana
upon which authority elsewhere is divided: the Montana court held
that a defendant can validly waive the right to counsel even after
effectively asserting that right. 89 Waiver of the right to counsel
will not be presumed, however, and the state bears a heavy burden
to show waiver.140 In Blakney, the court held, the evidence sup-
ported a finding of valid waiver after effective assertion of the right
to counsel. "
3. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Adopting the general rule that "evidence gained as a result of
constitutional violation cannot be used to uncover other physical
evidence,' ' 4 2 the Montana court, in State v. Allies, for the first
time held that physical evidence obtained as the fruit of an ille-
gally obtained confession is also inadmissible. 4 3 In Allies, the de-
fendant's confession was held to be the result of impermissible po-
lice tactics and was declared involuntary. His confession led
officers to the location of a pistol used to convict him. The court
recognized three general exceptions, to the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine: (1) if the evidence is sufficiently attenuated from the
134. Id., quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th
Cir. 1972).
135. - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198, 200 (1979).
136. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 203.
137. Id.
138. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979).
139. Id. at , 605 P.2d at 1097.
140. Id.
141. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 1098.
142. State v. Allies, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043, 1052 (1979).
143. Id.
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constitutional violation so as to remove its primary taint, it will be
admissible; (2) if the evidence is obtained from a source indepen-
dent of the defendant's confession, it will be admissible; or (3) if it
is inevitable that the evidence would have been discovered apart
from the defendant's confession, it will be admissible."" None of
the exceptions was found to apply to the facts of Allies and both
the pistol and the confession were excluded from evidence.
4. Suppression Hearings and Scope of Review
The decision of a trial court to admit or suppress a confession
is seldom overturned on appeal because the scope of review is lim-
ited. Several recent decisions reaffirm what has long been the law
in Montana: the issue of voluntariness is a factual issue addressed
to the discretion of the trial court." " Review by the supreme court
is limited to determining whether there is substantial credible evi-
dence supporting the trial court's findings,14 6 and the trial court's
judgment as to voluntariness will not be reversed on appeal unless
it is clearly against the weight of the evidence. 7
The decision of the trial court following a suppression hearing
is, therefore, generally final-a fact which makes the suppression
hearing most significant to the outcome of a trial. Several recent
decisions have dealt with the procedures to be observed at a sup-
pression hearing.14 8 In Blakney, MCA § 46-13-301(4), which re-
quires the defendant to prove his confession involuntary, was ex-
pressly held to violate due process requirements because it
improperly placed the burden of proof in a suppression hearing
upon the defendant."1 ' Recent Montana and United States Su-
preme Court decisions clearly require the state to prove the volun-
tariness of a confession at a suppression hearing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.1 50 In Dess, the trial court was reversed and
the defendant's confession was suppressed because the state failed
144. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 1052-53.
145. State v. Allies, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1979); State v. Blakney,
- Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1979); State v. Grimestad, - Mont. ., 598
P.2d 198, 202 (1979).
146. State v. Allies, Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1979); State v. Grimestad,
- Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198, 203 (1979).
147. State v. Blakney, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1979); State v. Grimes-
tad, - Mont. ,' 598 P.2d 198, 202 (1979).
148. State v. Blakney, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093 (1979); State v. Dess,
Mont. -, 602 P.2d 142 (1979); State v. Grimestad, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 198 (1979).
149. __ Mont. - , 605 P.2d 1093, 1098 (1979).
150. Id.; State v. Dess, - Mont. - , 602 P.2d 142, 144 (1979); State v. Grimestad,
- Mont. - , 598 P.2d 198, 203 (1979); State v. Smith, 164 Mont. 334, 338, 523 P.2d
1395, 1397 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
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to prove voluntariness; in fact, the state failed to present any evi-
dence whatsoever:
[W]hen the state fails to show that appellant was advised of his
Miranda rights, that appellant made the statement attributed to
him, or any evidence other than appellant had the mental capac-
ity to make a voluntary statement, a finding the state has carried
its burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evi-
dence is clearly against the weight of the evidence and must be
overturned on appeal." 1
In Blakney, the trial court, in reliance on an unconstitutional
statute, had clearly and improperly placed the burden of proof of
involuntariness on the defendant. 15 2 Recognizing the error to be
federal constitutional error, the Montana court sought to apply the
harmless error doctrine: "While not all errors of constitutional
magnitude call for reversal, '. . . before a federal constitutional er-
ror can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "'3 A bare major-
ity of the court found the burden shifting in Blakney to have been
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Its holding on this
point is, however, unsound, relying as it did on a federal circuit
decision which dealt with harmless error in the burden of produc-
ing evidence, rather than the burden of proof.'5" The court im-
properly held that as long as all of the salient facts were aired, the
error was harmless. 5 6 While an airing of all of the salient facts
might well negate the harm resulting from error in the order of
proof, it does not remedy harm resulting from error in the burden
of proof.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Burden-Shifting Instructions
There were a number of significant court holdings relating to
due process requirements in the context of jury instructions. Most
notable was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Sandstrom v. Montana.'5 7 The Court there held that instructing
the jury over defendant's objection that "the law presumes that a
151. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 142, 144 (1979).
152. - Mont..., 605 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979).
153. Id., quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
154. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093, 1100 (1979).
155. Id., citing Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 916 (1964).
156. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1093, 1100 (1979).
157. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).
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person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"16
violated federal due process standards. Since the jury could have
interpreted the challenged presumption either as being conclu-
sive ' 59 or as shifting the burden of persuasion' " to the defendant,
and since either interpretation violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's requirement that the state prove every element of a crimi-
nal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction was uncon-
stitutional. 6' The Court remanded, however, to the Montana
Supreme Court for determination as to whether giving the offen-
sive instruction constituted harmless error in the particular con-
text of the defendant's trial.1 52 On remand the Montana Supreme
Court was unable to determine that the unconstitutional instruc-
tion could not have contributed to the jury's verdict convicting de-
fendant of deliberate homicide. Because it could not conclude that
giving the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,1 63
158. The presumption invalidated by the Court is statutorily classified as a "disputa-
ble presumption" at MCA § 26-1-602(3) (1979).
159. - U.S. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 2456, 2458-59.
160. Id. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 2456, 2459. There are several recent Montana cases in
which the Montana Supreme Court has rejected arguments based on the underlying "bur-
den-shifting" concepts that proved successful in Sandstrom v. Montana. Defendants mak-
ing such arguments have generally relied on the principle that a criminal defendant is de-
nied due process of law when the state is not required to prove every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt as that principle was developed in Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 784 (1975) and in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See cases discussed in the
survey and State v. Cooper, - Mont. -, 589 P.2d 133 (1979) (state's failure to prove
absence of "justifiable use of force" beyond a reasonable doubt did not impermissibly shift
the burden of proof to defendant). Mullaney v. Wilbur invalidated a rule of Maine law that
a defendant must, in order to reduce a homicide to manslaughter, bear the burden of prov-
ing by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted "in the heat of passion or sudden
provocation." The case held that malice, a necessary element of murder, may not be pre-
sumed, thereby relieving the state of the burden of proving every element of the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, the Supreme Court applied the same principle in In re
Winship to invalidate a New York statute providing that for a juvenile to be found guilty of
an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the state need prove only
guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected due process challenges to felony-murder stat-
utes based on the burden-shifting principle of Mullaney and Wilbur, holding contrary to
defendants' assertions that a specific intent to kill, premeditation, wilfulness or delibera-
tion, knowledge or other mental state simply are not elements of the applicable statute. See,
e.g., State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash.2d 301, 588 P.2d 1320, 1325 (1978); Rodriquez v. State, 548
S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407, 226 S.E.2d 652,
668 (1976); State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 604-05 (Iowa 1976); People v. Root, 524 F.2d
195, 198 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Frezal, 278 So.2d 64, 67-68 (La. 1973).
161. - U.S. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 2459-60.
162. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2461.
163. State v. Sandstrom, - Mont. -, 603 P.2d 244, 245 (1979). The Montana
court applied the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and
declared that "[blefore a federal constitutional error can be harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Sand-
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the Montana court remanded to district court for retrial.
In State v. Coleman,'" however, the court came to the oppo-
site conclusion. The Montana Supreme Court there considered
whether an instruction given at defendant's trial was sufficiently
similar to the instruction found constitutionally invalid in Sand-
strom v. Montana'6 as to require reversal of the defendant's con-
viction for deliberate homicide. The court held that the instruction
was constitutionally sound. The jury had been instructed that it
might infer that if it found that the defendant had indeed commit-
ted a homicide it could infer that the homicide was committed
knowingly or purposely. Unlike the mandatory instruction con-
demned by the United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom, the
instruction in Coleman was permissive in nature.1 6 The Montana
court found that it did not have the effect of shifting some of the
prosecutor's burden of proof to defendant.16 7 Invoking the doctrine
that the instructions had to be viewed as a whole, the court noted
that the jury had been amply instructed on the state's burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on the defendant's presump-
tion of innocence. ' Furthermore, in the court's view, the con-
tested instruction had to be interpreted together with the "circum-
stantial evidence" instruction given to the jury.' 9 The latter
instruction informed the jury that since all the evidence against
the defendant was circumstantial, to support a verdict of guilty the
evidence not only had to be consistent with defendant's guilt, but
also inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of his inno-
cence.170 The court concluded that this circumstantial evidence in-
struction together with the permissive language in the disputed in-
struction effectively instructed the jury that any inference of
mental state based on the challenged instruction would be insuffi-
cient unless it was inconsistent with any hypothesis other than
guilt.' 7 ' Whereas Sandstrom related to a presumption of law, the
Coleman instruction referred only to an inference of fact, which by
its terms was not unreasonable.'7 2 In State v. Williams,7 8 the
Montana Supreme Court rejected another argument based on the
strom, - Mont. -, 603 P.2d 244, 245 (1979).
164. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1000 (1979).
165. - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979).
166. - Mont. at - , 605 P.2d at 1052-54.
167. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 1054.
168. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 1053-54.
169. Id at __, 605 P.2d at 1053.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at , 605 P.2d at 1052.
173. - Mont. - , 604 P.2d 1224 (1979).
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burden-shifting rationale of Sandstrom. An instruction to the jury
that it could infer purpose or knowledge from "acts, conduct, or
circumstances" appearing in evidence was held not to shift the
burden of proof of mental state from the state to the defendant in
violation of the principles set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana.1 7 4
The basis for the infirmity of the instruction in Sandstrom, the
court explained, was that the jurors were not told that they had a
choice or that they might infer that the defendant had acted with
intent.7 5 Instead they were told that the law presumed intent. 7 6
The Montana court reaffirmed the proposition that it is permissi-
ble to draw usual reasonable inferences from overt acts.'77
The court rejected a similar argument in State v. Coleman.17 8
Defense counsel had urged that a jury instruction on the mental
state "knowingly" phrased in the statutory language' 7 9 intruded on
the fact-finding function of the jury. Defendant claimed (1) that
the instruction violated the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt since it required only proof of defendant's awareness of the
results of his conduct "to a high probability," (2) that the instruc-
tion in effect embodied a conclusive presumption that a mental
state is established if the jury found a high probability of its exis-
tence, and (3) that the statutory standard of "high probability"
lacks "the quality which would enable the jury to convict." 80 In
disposing of these arguments, the court held in effect that the con-
tested instruction was not an instruction on the state's burden of
proof, but rather a substantive statutory definition of a criminally
culpable mental state. 8' The jury was not told that the state
needed only to prove the existence of the mental state "knowingly"
to a "high probability" instead of beyond a reasonable doubt.18
Rather, the jury was instructed that the mental state was estab-
lished if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was aware of a substantial likelihood that his conduct could pro-
duce a forbidden result.' 83
174. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 1232.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id., quoting Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945).
178. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 1000 (1979).
179. MCA § 45-2-101(27) (1979).
180. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 1054 (1979).
181. Id. at - , 605 P.2d at 1055.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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B. Presumption of Innocence Instruction
In the recent case of State v. Williams,"" the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the defendant was entitled upon request to
an instruction as to the presumption of innocence even though the
jury was properly instructed as to the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.'8 5 Failure to give the instruction after defendant
had requested it constituted per se reversible error. In so holding,
the Montana court followed prior Montana case law which had
established an absolute rule 86 and expressly declined to follow
United States Supreme Court holdings which establish a "totality
of the circumstances" test to determine whether denial of a re-
quested presumption of innocence instruction constitutes revers-
ible error."s8 The Montana court grounded its decision on two con-
siderations. First, it stated that Montana has historically set higher
standards than the federal courts."" Second, it asserted that appli-
cation of the federal "totality of the circumstances" test would
necessarily require the trial judge to pass on both the quality and
the quantity of the evidence presented."89 Such an evaluation by
the trial court would usurp the jury's role as fact finder."90 That
usurpation, in the court's view, would amount to a partial denial of
defendant's right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the state and
federal constitutions.'
IV. PUBLICITY
A. Introduction
Concern for the integrity of the decision-making function of
184. - Mont. -, 601 P.2d 1194 (1979).
185. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 1195.
186. State v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, 5, 66 P. 291, 292 (1901); State v. Harrison, 23 Mont.
79, 57 P. 647 (1899).
187. Kentucky v. Wharton, - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 2088 (1979); Taylor v. Kentucky,
436 U.S. 478 (1978). In Kentucky v. Wharton, the United States Supreme Court held that
failure of the trial court to give a requested jury instruction on the presumption of inno-
cence does not in and of itself violate the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Under Taylor [v. Kentucky] such a failure must be evaluated in light of the total-
ity of the circumstances--including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments
of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming and other rele-
vant factors-to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair
trial.
- U.S. 99 S.Ct. at 2090.
188. - Mont. -, 601 P.2d at 1196.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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the jury at all stages of the trial process-at pretrial suppression
hearings, at trial and in the instructions of the jury-was a recur-
rent theme in recent Montana and United States Supreme Court
cases. The "jury instruction" cases sought to insure that the jury's
fact-finding process would not be compromised by erroneous in-
structions of law. The cases considered in this section reflect a con-
cern that the impartiality of the jury function will not be tainted
by prejudicial publicity arising either before or during trial. The
effect of adverse publicity on the defendant's fair trial right and
the judicial remedies available to vindicate that right are the cen-
tral issues in publicity cases.
The right of the accused to a fair trial in a criminal prosecu-
tion is vouchsafed by the Sixth Amendment 92 to the federal con-
stitution and by Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution
of 1972. The United States Supreme Court has deemed the right to
a fair trial "the most fundamental of all freedoms."19s The failure
to accord the accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors
violates even the minimum requirements of due process.' The
principle of fairness does not mandate a perfect trial.1as It does,
however, require "an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases." 196
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that "our system of law has endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. ' '1 97 In some instances, changing the place
of trial may be the only remedy "sufficient to assure the kind of
impartial jury guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."'9 s
192. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....
The United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in state criminal cases. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968), reh. denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968). Similarly, sections 17 and 24 of Arti-
cle II of the 1972 Montana Constitution provide, respectively, that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," and that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right. . . to have . . . a speedy trial by an impartial
jury .... "
193. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
194. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1960). "In essence, the right to jury trial guar-
antees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial 'indifferent' jurors. The
failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due pro-
cess." Id.
195. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
196. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
197. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (emphasis added).
198. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971).
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B. Pretrial and Mid-Trial Publicity
Confronted with the dangers of adverse publicity affecting the
trial, the courts usually adopt one of three remedies: (1) postpone-
ment of the trial to allow the fires of public passion to subside; (2)
"searching" voir dire of the jurors to eradicate prejudice; and (3)
"a change of venue to a community less exposed to the intense
publicity."1 '9 9 In Montana only the second remedy is employed
199. Fahringer, Charting a Course from the Free Press to a Fair Trial, 12 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fahringer]. There are, of course, other potential
remedies for adverse publicity. They include in appropriate cases, waiver of a jury trial,
sequestration of the jury, gag orders, exclusion of the press and public from all or part of the
proceedings. See generally Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review, 21
U. VILL. L. REV. 819 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ranney]; Ferber, Beating Bad Press: Pro-
tecting the California Criminal Defendant from Adverse Publicity, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 391
(1976); Note, Judicial Control of Pretrial and Trial Publicity: A Reexamination of the Ap-
plicable Constitutional Standards, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 101 (1975).
The place of trial in a criminal prosecution is generally the county where the alleged
offense was committed. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; MCA § 46-3-101(1) (1979). This general
rule is subject to one exception. MCA § 46-13-203 (1979) provides that the defendant or
prosecution can move for a change of place of trial at least fifteen days prior to trial if such
a degree of prejudice prevails in the county where the offense was committed as would pre-
clude a fair trial for the defendant. The statute further provides that the motion be made in
writing and be supported by affidavits "which shall state facts showing the nature of the
prejudice alleged." Thereafter the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
the merits of the affidavits. MCA §§ 46-13-203(2), -3-101(2) (1979).
The legal requisites of a continuance of trial because of the furor caused by prejudicial
publicity are set forth in MCA § 46-13-202 (1979). That statute provides that "motions for
continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial court and shall be considered in light
of the diligence shown on the part of the movant." MCA § 46-13-202(3) (1979). The court
may require the motion to be supported by affidavit, MCA § 46-13-202(1) (1979), and may
grant the motion "if the interests of justice so require." MCA § 46-13-202(2) (1979). The
statute itself seems to militate against a liberal policy of granting continuances: it provides
that the statute "shall be construed to the end that criminal cases are tried with the rights
of the defendant and the state to a speedy trial." MCA § 46-13-202(3) (1979). Case law has
imposed stricter requirements on motions for postponement of trial in order to procure
missing evidence. It is not clear whether those requirements would be construed to apply to
continuances due to prejudicial publicity as well. In contradistinction to MCA § 46-13-
202(1) (1979), which permits the trial judge in his discretion to require affidavits in support
of the motion, MCA § 25-4-501 (1979) mandates affidavits to support a motion for a contin-
uance to procure additional evidence. Although the statute is contained in Title 25 dealing
with civil procedure, it was held very early in Territory v. Perkins, 2 Mont. 467, 470 (1876)
that similar provisions of the Territorial Civil Procedure Act relating to postponement of
trial in civil actions were equally applicable to criminal cases. Ever since that holding, Mon-
tana criminal cases considering the conditions under which a continuance will be granted
have relied on statutes similar to the ones invoked in Perkins or on case law traceable to the
holding in Perkins. See, e.g., State v. Pascgo, 173 Mont. 121, 124, 566 P.2d 802, 804 (1977),
relying on R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1708, the predecessor to MCA § 25-4-501 (1979); State v.
Moorman, 133 Mont. 148, 156-57, 321 P.2d 236, 241 (1957); State v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417,
423-24, 43 P. 182, 184 (1896); State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213, 217-18, 25 P. 289, 290 (1890). It
is at least remotely possible that by a process of analogy the civil statutes governing motions
for continuance, MCA §§ 25-4-501 through 504 (1979), could be construed (1) to mandate
affidavits upon motions for postponement of trial for any purpose and (2) to apply generally
29
Johnson and Joyce Johnson: Criminal Procedure
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1980
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
with any regularity.200 Two Montana cases decided during the sur-
vey period dealt directly or indirectly with all three of these reme-
dies to prejudicial pretrial publicity. In addition the Montana
Supreme Court decided for the first time what remedy was appro-
priate to cure the effects of adverse publicity which arises after the
accused's trial has commenced.
While arguably reaching just results under the factual situa-
tions presented for review, two recent Montana cases are neverthe-
less illustrative of the general judicial reluctance to grant affirma-
tive judicial relief to cure the effects of prejudicial pretrial and
mid-trial publicity.2 0 1 In State v. Kirkland0 2 the Montana Su-
preme Court upheld a conviction of aggravated assault against de-
fendant's assertion that the trial court had erred in not allowing
him to interrogate members of the jury concerning their exposure
to allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial news releases. Two of the
allegedly prejudicial news stories were made public on the day
before trial. The third was broadcast by a local television station
on the first day of trial. All of the news releases, both in the press
and on television, depicted the accused as a paid assassin.
Having never decided the issue, the court first considered
what action a trial judge must take when prejudicial news releases
are brought to his attention. The court refused to adopt the rule
followed by some federal and state courts requiring the trial judge
to examine the jurors to determine whether any of them had read
the prejudicial news release and to assess the effects of the public-
ity.2 0 3 Indeed the court refused to impose any specific procedures
on the lower court at all, preferring to leave the matter "to the
trial judge's judgment and discretion. . . subject to. . .review on
appeal."20 The court advanced several reasons for this approach:
(1) a mandatory requirement of an immediate examination of the
jury would be an inflexible standard and would destroy the trial
judge's discretionary control over the proceedings; (2) a mandatory
rule might inject error into the trial where none had existed before;
(3) defense counsel might abuse the rule to disrupt the trial or to
in criminal cases.
200. See notes 222-30 and accompanying text infra.
201. The Montana Supreme Court has overturned a trial court's denial of a defen-
dant's motion for change of venue in only two cases: See State v. Dryman, 127 Mont. 579,
269 P.2d 796 (1954); State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 P. 1026 (1899). See generally
Note, Criminal Law: Extensive Publicity May Prevent a Fair Trial, 27 MONT. L. REV. 205,
208 (1965).
202. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 586 (1979).
203. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 593.
204. Id.
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distract the jurors; (4) the need for a per se rule is questionable
since the defense can request a poll of the jury after its verdict or
can subpoena jurors on motion for a new trial to show that the
jurors had knowledge of the prejudicial publicity; and (5) on ap-
peal the ruling of the trial judge is subject to review.2 05
There are three principle difficulties with the court's rationale.
First, some of the enumerated justifications for the court's discre-
tionary approach are highly speculative in nature. Second, the
court formulates no guidelines to inform the exercise of the trial
judge's discretion in dealing with mid-trial publicity. The biggest
problem is, however, the court's emphasis on a post-trial appellate
remedy. In practical terms the result may well be no real remedy
at all, given the deferential standard of review generally applied by
courts in reviewing prejudicial publicity issues.
Appellate courts in Montana and elsewhere, for example, fol-
low the well established rule that granting or refusing a change of
venue requested by defendant as a cure for prejudicial publicity is
within the "sound discretion" of the trial court.2 °0 A clear showing
of abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a change of
venue is required to support a reversal.20 7 Applying the same
"abuse of discretion" standard of review to the mid-trial publicity
issue in this case, the supreme court held that the trial judge had
not erred in denying defense counsel's request to examine the
jury.2 08 In so holding the court placed considerable emphasis on
the fact that at the time of voir dire defense counsel had knowl-
edge of a media attempt to brand his client as a hired killer, that
he had been permitted to voir dire the prospective jurors on their
knowledge of press reports of the case, that the selected jurors in-
dicated they had not been influenced by media reports and that
they would render a verdict based solely on the evidence.20 9 As dis-
cussed below,21 0 even after juror exposure to prejudicial publicity,
defense counsel's opportunity to examine the jury on voir dire is
almost invariably regarded by appellate courts as a satisfactory
remedy.
205. Id.
206. State v. Hoffman, 94 Mont. 573, 580, 23 P.2d 972, 974 (1933); State v. Davis, 60
Mont. 426, 431, 199 P. 421, 422 (1921). See generally Ranney, supra note 199, at 830.
207. State v. Lewis, 169 Mont. 290, 295, 546 P.2d 518, 521 (1976); State v. Logan, 156
Mont. 48, 58, 473 P.2d 833, 838 (1970).
208. __ Mont. - , 602 P.2d at 593-94.
209. Id. at - , 602 P.2d at 594. The supreme court in Kirkland also found that the
news release broadcast after voir dire in no way prejudiced the accused since it contained
the same information as the two news reports made public before trial.
210. See notes 222-30 and accompanying text infra.
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In State v. Williams211 the Montana court held that defen-
dant's motions for a change of venue and, alternatively, for a con-
tinuance due to allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity were prop-
erly denied by the trial court where on voir dire only three of the
twelve jurors could recall having heard anything about the case
and they remembered only the defendant's unusual first name or
that a gas station had been robbed.1 2 The court also noted that
one juror had not been asked any questions during voir dire.213
Under these circumstances there was no showing that the defen-
dant was denied a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors as the
accused contended. In upholding the denial of motions for a
change of venue or continuance, the supreme court stated that the
decision to grant either motion was within the discretion of the
trial court.2 15 Absent a clear abuse of discretion a trial court denial
of a motion for change of the place of trial would not be dis-
turbed.16 Similarly, the court stated that a denial of a motion for a
continuance until the fervor of the publicity had died down would
not be granted without a showing of prejudice to the movant.2 7
The court specified neither the scope of allowable judicial discre-
tion nor the quantum of prejudicial pretrial publicity requisite for
either a change of venue or a continuance.
As has often been pointed out by commentators, "the whole
area of prejudicial publicity has not lent itself to many clear cut
rules, being somewhat amorphous in terms of defining the problem
and in terms of devising appropriate remedies. 2 18 Usually the
courts make no attempt to systematically define the precise crite-
ria which should inform the "sound discretion" of the trial court.
Nevertheless, the Montana court has stated that the following fac-
tors are indicative of a denial of an accused's rights to a fair trial
due to pretrial publicity: the aroused feelings of the community, a
threat to the defendant's personal safety, community opinions re-
garding the defendant's guilt, and slanted news articles."9 Al-
though case law offers no reliable guide as to how the presence of
these factors may be proven or what constitutes sufficient proof,
211. - Mont. - , 604 P.2d 1224 (1979).
212. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 1227.
213. Id.
214. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 1226-28.
215. Id. at -' 604 P.2d at 1226-27. See also MCA § 46-13-202(3) (1979) (motions for
continuance are addressed to trial court's discretion).
216. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 1226; see notes 206 and 207 and accompanying text
supra.
217. Williams, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 1226-27.
218. Ranney, supra note 8, at 819-20.
219. State v. Board, 135 Mont. 139, 143, 337 P.2d 924, 927 (1959).
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the Montana cases do make clear that pretrial publicity in and of
itself does not justify a change of venue. Additional evidence must
be presented to show that publicity was so prejudicial as to pre-
vent the accused from receiving an impartial trial.22 It also ap-
pears to be well settled in Montana that mere publication of a
news story concerning a crime is neither a deprivation of a consti-
tutional right nor a ground for change of venue; the affidavits must
show passion and prejudice flowing from the publications.2 21
The court may justify a denial of change of venue by empha-
sizing the relative ease with which the jury was selected. 2  In
State v. Hoffman, 28 for example, the court found the fact that few
talesmen had to be examined in order to form a jury was persua-
sive in overcoming the charge that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to change the place of trial.224 Similarly, the court
has held that the trial court's refusal to grant a venue change was
not improper where the trial judge performed an individual voir
dire examination as to each juror's knowledge of the case and re-
ceived each juror's assurance that he or she could render an impar-
tial verdict based solely on the evidence presented.225 A related
factor considered by the supreme court was the extent of the pro-
spective jurors' familiarity with the publicity and its effect upon
them, as shown by their answers on voir dire.2 26 Other factors in-
clude the extent to which defense counsel has utilized his peremp-
tory challenges 227 or challenges for cause. 228 In State v. Corliss
229
the court considered it significant, although not dispositive, that all
but two of the witnesses who testified expressed the opinion that
the defendant could obtain a fair trial in the county.23
By statute, motions for a change of venue must be accompa-
nied by a supporting affidavit.28 1 The court has repeatedly rejected
as insufficient supporting affidavits, circulated petitions, or public
220. State v. Stewart, 151 Mont. 551, 555-56, 445 P.2d 741, 744 (1968); State v. Bess,
60 Mont. 558, 569, 199 P. 426, 429 (1921).
221. State v. Corliss, 150 Mont. 40, 49, 430 P.2d 632, 637 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
691 (1968); Hanrahan v. District Court, 145 Mont. 501, 507-08, 401 P.2d 770, 774 (1965).
222. State v. Stewart, 151 Mont. 551, 556, 445 P.2d 741, 744 (1968).
223. 94 Mont. 573, 23 P.2d 972 (1933).
224. Id. at 580, 23 P.2d at 974.
225. See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 171 Mont. 238, 246, 557 P.2d 283, 287 (1976).
226. State v. Corliss, 150 Mont. 40, 49, 430 P.2d 632, 637 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
961 (1968) (only one of the forty-six veniremen examined admitted having formed an opin-
ion regarding defendant's guilt or innocence).
227. Id. at -, 430 P.2d at 638.
228. State v. Bess, 60 Mont. 558, 569, 199 P. 426, 429 (1921).
229. 150 Mont. 40, 430 P.2d 632 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968).
230. Id. at 49, 430 P.2d at 637.
231. MCA § 46-13-203(2) (1979).
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opinion polls which recite in conclusory fashion that the defendant
cannot receive a fair trial in the county due to public prejudice
against him.2 32 In the court's words, "[The affidavit] ought to state
facts so that the court, not the witnesses, may determine whether
the community is prejudiced. '2 23 The affidavits must show "pas-
sion" and "prejudice" flowing from the publications. 34
Both the continuance and the "searching" voir dire remedies
are often unsatisfactory. 3 Continuance of the trial merely
postpones the harm. Although the impact of bad publicity may
wane with the passage of time, the memory is quickly revived when
the trial takes place.2 6 At least one court has held that granting a
change of venue is preferable to a continuance since it preserves
rather than erodes the accused's constitutional right to a speedy
trial.237 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has criticized
the continuance as working "against the important values implicit
in the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. 2 ' The "search-
ing" voir dire so heavily relied upon in Montana has been con-
demned as "the most impractical and hypocritical of the solutions
for dealing with this quandary and should be abandoned as a rem-
edy for prejudicial pretrial publicity. 2' 9 First, it causes courts to
downplay other means of assuring a fair trial. Second, it is ineffec-
tive in uncovering prejudice because of a "lack of candor on the
part of most jurors. ' 2 0 Third, voir dire involves the additional risk
that inflammatory remarks by one juror will poison the attitudes of
others." 1 Even when voir dire is conducted in isolation, there is a
danger that jurors in the assembly areas will be influenced by the
remarks of those influenced by unfriendly publicity.2 42 Prejudice
232. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 169 Mont. 290, 296, 546 P.2d 518, 521 (1976); State v.
Davis, 60 Mont. 426, 431, 199 P. 421, 422 (1921); Note, Criminal Law: Extensive Publicity
May Prevent a Fair Trial, 27 MONT. L. REV. 205, 209 n.29 (1965). Recitals of what lay
persons think other people are thinking are regarded as having little weight in deciding
whether a change of venue should be granted. State v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 157, 308
P.2d 969, 971 (1957); State v. Warrick, 152 Mont. 94, 102, 446 P.2d 916, 921 (1960).
233. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 103 P. 387, 390 (1888). For the kinds of factual
evidence that should be included in supporting affidavits or which should be offered at an
evidentiary hearing on this issue, see generally AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DE-
FENSE § 256 (3d ed. 1974).
234. Hanrahan v. District Court, 145 Mont. 501, 507-08, 401 P.2d 770, 774 (1965).
235. Fahringer, supra note 199, at 9.
236. Id.
237. Commonwealth v. Casper, 375 A.2d 737, 742-43 (Pa. Super. 1977).
238. Gropp v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971).
239. Fahringer, supra note 199, at 11; see also Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 726-27
(1961).
240. Fahringer, supra note 199, at 10.
241. Id. at 11.
242. Id.
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once lodged in the mind of a juror is not readily exorcised by ritu-
alistic application of traditional ceremonies and formalities. Chief
Justice Hughes once wrote: "Impartiality is not a technical concep-
tion. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental
attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
formula." 4"
The United States Supreme Court has acted to protect crimi-
nal defendants against the strong probability of prejudice. In
Rideau v. Louisiana, " the Court did not require a showing of ac-
tual prejudice to the defendant via voir dire examination of jurors
in holding that a state court's refusal to grant a change of venue
made a fair trial impossible. Prior to trial, local television broad-
casted an interview in which the accused confessed to murder, rob-
bery, and kidnapping. Stating that in a very real sense the tele-
vised spectacle was the defendant's trial,245 the Court held that,
"without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir
dire examination of members of the jury," due process required a
jury drawn from a community which had not been exposed to the
televised confession.2 46 The Court presumed prejudice to the ac-
cused from the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity.247
The importance of protecting against a "probability of unfair-
ness"2 48 is reflected in the ABA Standards relating to fair trial and
free press. They urge that a motion for a change of venue be
granted whenever the trial court determines that the dissemination
of potentially prejudicial material has created a reasonable likeli-
hood that a fair trial cannot be had.2 49 The court's determination
must be based on qualified public opinion surveys, opinion testi-
mony, or on the court's own evaluation of the nature, frequency,
and timing of the disseminated materials. The standards expressly
state that a showing of actual prejudice shall not be required. 50
243. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936).
244. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
245. Id. at 726.
246. Id. at 727.
247. A persuasive factor in the Supreme Court's holding was the relatively small size
of the community in which the pretrial publicity was disseminated-a situation in which
voir dire is an ineffective remedy due to the high probability that most potential jurors have
not escaped exposure to the unfriendly news. Small, rural, and relatively homogenous com-
munities are the norm in Montana. In the interest of preserving the defendant's constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, the Rideau rationale could well have been urged on
the court in State v. Williams. Prejudice to the defendant-or at least a high probability of
it-could perforce have been presumed.
248. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
249. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.2(c) (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
250. Id.
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C. Exclusion of Press from Pretrial Suppression Hearings
Exclusion of the public and the press from pretrial proceed-
ings is yet another remedy for adverse publicity. Although there is
a significant danger that publicity during trial may prejudice the
accused's right to a fair trial by an unbiased jury, 51 the danger is
most urgent in the context of such pretrial proceedings as prelimi-
nary examinations and suppression hearings. Media coverage of
inadmissible, inculpatory evidence discussed at a suppression hear-
ing could threaten the empanelling of a constitutionally impartial
jury. Plainly, the defendant's right to a public trial may perforce
run counter to the purposes of his fair trial right. Furthermore, a
request for exclusion precipitates an ostensible conflict between
the accused's right to a fair trial and the purported right of public
access to criminal proceedings under the First,2 52 Sixth, and Four-
teenth Amendments.
A recent United States Supreme Court case addressed but un-
fortunately failed to resolve some of these issues. Last term in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,25 s a decision loudly decried by the
press, the Supreme Court held that neither the Sixth nor the Four-
teenth Amendment prevented the closure of pretrial suppression
251. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
252. In 1970 the American Bar Association adopted standards in response to the War-
ren Commission Report regarding the fair trial-free press dilemma in criminal cases that
become the focus of large amounts of publicity. The ABA completed two studies which com-
ment on the Warren Report: ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS,
THE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1969), thq so-called REARDON REPORT; and SPE-
CIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL: FINAL REPORT WITH RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1967). Both sought a balance between the flow of information from the press to
the public and the maintenance of integrity protecting the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. The following resources analyze the fair trial-free press conflict: SHOEMAKER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONFLICT AND FREE PREss-FAIR TRIAL (1972); Merrill, The "People's Right to
Know" Myth, 45 N.Y. ST. B. J. 461 (1973); Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal
Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1975); Comment,
Free Press v. Fair Trial: Insulation Against Injustice, 33 LA. L. REV. 547 (1972-73); Com-
ment, Fair Trial and Free Press: Preliminary Hearing-Gateway to Prejudice, LAW & Soc.
ORDER 903 (1973); Comment, Free Press v. Fair Trial: A Constitutional Dichotomy, 20
LOYOLA L. REV. 148 (1973-74); Comment, Procedural Compromise and Contempt: Feasible
Alternatives in the Fair Trial Versus Free Press Controversy, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 650 (1969-
70).
To date the Supreme Court has held that the newsgathering rights of the public and of
the press under the First Amendment are coextensive. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
833-34 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972). The Court has not yet ruled definitively on whether or not the First
Amendment grants a public right of access to information in government control. It would
appear that no constitutional provision affirmatively grants the institutional press greater
rights than accorded the public generally.
253. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979).
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hearings where a public proceeding would have jeopardized the
right of criminal defendants to a fair trial and where both the
court and the prosecution consented to the defendants' request for
exclusion of the public. The defendants, charged with second-de-
gree robbery, murder, and grand larceny in a state prosecution, re-
quested that the public and the press be excluded from the hear-
ing, arguing that adverse publicity endangered their right to a fair
trial. Subsequently, a newspaper challenged the closure order on
First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Although the
Court held in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart6 4 that prior
restraints on publicity concerning judicial proceedings were pre-
sumptively invalid as a means of protecting the right of a criminal
defendant to a fair trial, it specifically declined to decide whether a
trial court could close the trial to safeguard that right.2"5 Due to
the opinion's ambiguity and the fragmentation of the Court, Gan-
nett does not, however, unequivocally resolve the question.
Justice Stewart's majority opinion rested the Court's holding
on "two independently sufficient [rationales] with vastly different
implications. ' 256 An analysis of the common-law history and na-
ture of the public's interest in public trials led Justice Stewart to
conclude that even though strong societal interests in public trials
and publicity do exist,251 the public's independent interest in en-
forcing the Sixth Amendment's public trial guarantee is not tanta-
mount to a constitutional right of the public to do S0.25 8 He con-
cluded that the specific language of the Sixth Amendment that
"the accused shall enjoy the right to a. . . public trial by an im-
partial jury," implied that the right was personal to the accused. 69
Moreover, he maintained that both the Constitution and history
were devoid of any evidence of an independent public right of ac-
cess to a criminal trial.' e0 Stewart's second argument was that even
if the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did create a public right
of access to criminal trials, the right would not extend to pretrial
hearings. For, he reasoned, there was no right at common law to
attend pretrial proceedings,26 and at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution public trials were clearly associated with the pro-
254. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
255. Id. at 564 n.8.
256. Note, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (1979).
257. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. at 2907.
258. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2907-09.
259. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2905.
260. Id.
261. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2909.
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tection of the defendant.26 2 This conclusion was also compelled by
the purpose of the suppression hearing which is to screen out unre-
liable evidence and insure that it does not become known to the
jury.2" That purpose could be frustrated if press reports about in-
culpatory but inadmissible evidence considered at the suppression
hearings reached the public.
Petitioner also urged that the First Amendment granted the
press a right of access to criminal proceedings. With two concur-
rences, one supporting and one rejecting the argument, the major-
ity opinion initially skirted the issue by stating "even assuming,
arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments may guar-
antee such access in some situations, a question we do not decide,
this spectative right was given all appropriate deference by the
state nisi prius court in the present case."2 4 The majority opinion
stated further that the "trial court balanced the 'constitutional
rights of the press and the public' against the 'defendant's right to
a fair trial.'"266 While that language suggests that the majority
recognized a First Amendment right, the majority opinion subse-
quently claimed to have held that no such right exists:
[W]e are asked to hold that the Constitution itself gave the peti-
tioner an affirmative right of access to this pretrial proceeding,
even though all of the participants in the litigation agreed that it
should be closed to protect the fair trial rights of the defendants.
For all of the reasons discussed in this opinion, we hold that
the Constitution provides no such right.2 6
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist while
joining the majority opinion each wrote separate concurring opin-
ions. Chief Justice Burger ostensibly dissociated himself from the
majority's pronouncement that the public had no right of access to
criminal trials generally by emphasizing that the dispositive fea-
ture of the case was the pretrial nature of the proceedings in ques-
tion.267 Although agreeing with the majority's interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment, Justice Powell concluded that the public has a
right of access to both trials and pretrial hearings under the First
Amendment268 and advocated a case-by-case balancing of the con-
262. Id.
263. Id. at , 99 S.Ct. 2904-05, 2911.
264. Id. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2912.
265. Id.
266. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2913 (emphasis added).
267. Id. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2913 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
268. Id. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2914 (Powell, J., concurring).
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flicting rights of the public and the defendant.0 9 Justice Rehnquist
sought to expand the rationale underlying the majority opinion.2 °0
He maintained that the Court had repeatedly and clearly held that
"there is no First Amendment right of access in the public or press
to judicial or other governmental proceedings." '27 In his view, the
First Amendment was not a sort of constitutional "sunshine
law."2 2 Accordingly, a defendant seeking closure need show no
harm, nor need a trial judge show harm to justify closure.2 73 Justice
Blackmun argued in dissent that under the Sixth Amendment the
public had a right to attend criminal proceedings generally274 and
that closure could be valid only if "strictly and inescapably" neces-
sary.27 5 Looking to history and policy considerations, he concluded
that recognition of such a public right was essential to protect soci-
ety's interest in the integrity of the judicial system.270
The division of the justices in Gannett has engendered wide-
spread uncertainty among lower courts over what the Court held.
As one commentator has pointed out, the confusion is due in no
small measure to Justice Stewart's alternate Sixth Amendment
analyses which leave unclear whether the holding permits closure
of trials or only pretrial hearings.2  Several members of the Court
have made extrajudicial statements to clarify the meaning of Gan-
nett but have only succeeded in exacerbating the controversy sur-
rounding the case by projecting their disagreements into a public
forum.2 8 State trial courts have invoked Gannett to justify the
closing of whole trials and to close proceedings over the prosecu-
tor's objections.2 79 Not only did the Court's widely divided decision
269. Id. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2916 (Powell, J., concurring).
270. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2918-19 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
271. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2918 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2922-41 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
275. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2936 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
276. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2930-31 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
277. See generally Note, 93 HA.v. L. REV. 1, 65-66, 66 n.37 (1979).
278. Id. at 65, 65 n.32.
279. Id. at 65. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Civil No. 78-1598 (Va., filed
Nov. 8, 1978), the Virginia Supreme Court, relying on Gannett v. DePasquale, - U.S.
- 99 S.Ct. 2898 (1979) dismissed an appeal by a newspaper and reporters from an order
excluding press and public from the courtroom in a capital murder case. In so ruling, the
Virginia Supreme Court acted pursuant to VA. CODE 19.2-266 (Supp. 1979), which permitted
the trial court, in its discretion, to "exclude from the trial any person whose presence would
impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial
should not be violated .... " An appeal of the Virginia Supreme Court's order of dismissal
was filed August 14, 1979, with the United States Supreme Court to challenge the validity of
the Virginia statute. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 204,
62 L.Ed.2d 132 (1979). But cf. United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979)
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in Gannett fail to provide lower courts with guidance, it also has
invited and produced a similar fragmentation of state appellate
courts.28 0
Nevertheless, the argument of the majority that the Sixth
Amendment does not generally grant the public a right of access
to criminal trials is convincing. Textually, the amendment gives
the right to a public trial only to the accused. If, as the petitioners
in Gannett argued, the Sixth Amendment public trial right were
merely a restatement of the common-law rule for open trials, then
the Sixth Amendment would grant the public a right of access in
civil and in criminal cases as well.28 1 Yet the Sixth Amendment
does not speak in terms of civil cases at all. Viewing the amend-
ment's public trial right as personal to the defendant is not cause
to fear that a defendant can compel exclusion of the public. While
the amendment grants defendant a right to a public trial, it does
not guarantee him the right to compel a private trial.2 2 As the
Court succinctly stated, "The ability to waive a constitutional right
does not ordinarily carry with it the opposite of that right.12 8 In-
terestingly, the majority and the dissent agreed that there is a
strong public interest in open trials. Closure, it would seem, should
(Gannett does not support exclusion of public from post-trial hearing); United States v.
Powers, 477 F.Supp. 497, 498-99 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (closure of criminal trial not proper ab-
sent (1) consent of prosecutor or compelling reason for not requiring prosecution's consent,
(2) clear and convincing evidence that closure would prevent the harm alleged and proven to
exist, and (3) clear and convincing evidence that no effective alternatives to closure exist);
Shiras v. Britt, - Ark. - , 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979) (Gannett decision permitting closure
of pretrial hearings inapplicable in Arkansas due to statute declaring that the proceedings of
every court shall be open).
280. Most recently the four-member South Dakota Supreme Court interpreting Gan-
nett produced three separate opinions. But a majority of that court did conclude that noth-
ing in either the federal or state constitutions gave the press an absolute right of access to
any part of a criminal trial, including the jury voir dire involved in the case at bar. Rapid
City Journal v. Circuit Court, - S.D. -, 283 N.W.2d 563 (1979). But see, Commercial
Printing Co. & Tosca v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977) (press could not be ex-
cluded from voir dire in criminal case where state statute provided that the sittings of every
court shall be public).
281. Gannett v. DePasquale, - U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2908-09, and nn. 15 and 16
(1979).
In short, there is no principled basis upon which a public right of access to judicial
proceedings can be limited to criminal cases if the scope of the right is defined by
the common law rather than the text and structure of the Constitution.
Id. But cf. Quick, A Public Criminal Trial, 60 DICKINSON L. REv. 21, 22 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Quick] (suggesting that the common law practice of open trials motivated the pub-
lic trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment).
282. Gannett, 99 S.Ct. at 2907.
283. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). Cf. also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 559, 149 P.2d 563, 565 (1971) (defendant has no right to a secret
trial).
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only be invoked where there is no alternate remedy to preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 84
The public trial guarantee was one of the first procedural
rights to be extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a fundamental guarantee of due process.285 Although no
decision of the United States Supreme Court squarely holds that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is applicable to the
states, it is now almost universally assumed to be binding on the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.286 The same right is
guaranteed in Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution of
1972. The right to a public trial, one of the oldest and most closely
guarded criminal guarantees, 87 entitles the accused to the pres-
ence of at least friends, relatives, and counsel at trial.2 88 The ac-
cused is also entitled to adequate facilities for a "reasonable num-
ber" of persons who may wish to attend.2 89 The defendant's right
to a public trial extends to the entire proceeding and may be
violated if the public is excluded from even part of it.2 e9
Exclusion of the public from a criminal trial must be scruti-
nized in light of the dual purposes of the public trial right. These
purposes are: (1) to prevent the use of the courts as instruments of
persecution and to restrain abuse of judicial power by allowing the
public the opportunity "to observe courts in the performance of
their duties and to determine whether they are performing ade-
284. See United States v. Powers, 477 F.Supp. 497, 498-99 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
285. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
286. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968), reh. denied, 392 U.S. 947
(1968) (due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment "now protects... the Sixth Amend-
ment right ... to a. . .public trial," citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (citing Oliver); Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 603-04 (3d
Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 356 Mass. 432, 435, 253 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1969);
State v. Schmidt, 273 Minn. 78, 80, 139 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1966) ("The right to a public trial
can scarcely be regarded as less fundamental and essential to a fair trial than the right to
assistance of counsel, also granted by the Sixth Amendment. Despite the absence of a spe-
cific holding, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court tend to erase any linger-
ing doubts that the right to a public trial, no less than the right to counsel, is entitled to
protection from state invasion by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Riley v. State, 83 Nev. 282, 285, 429 P.2d 59, 61 (1967). Provisions similar to the Sixth
Amendment's are found in most state constitutions. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-68
(1948). The right, apart from the Sixth Amendment, has been upheld even where the state
constitution contains no express public trial guarantee. State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 382-90,
224 P.2d 500, 508-11 (1950). It has been regarded as fundamental even where it is only
provided for by statute. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1954).
287. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-71 (1948).
288. Id. at 272.
289. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965).
290. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 868 (1949).
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quately ' '2 9 and (2) to instill in the spectators confidence in judicial
remedies. 29" Thus, the first of these purposes reflects the defen-
dant's interests; the second reflects the public's. By laying greater
emphasis on one purpose than on the other, courts under similar
fact situations could conceivably reach different conclusions re-
garding exclusion of the public. The majority in Gannett held,
however, that only the first of the traditional dual purposes was
implicated in the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial.29
While acknowledging a strong societal interest in open trials, the
Court held that the public's interest in the swift and fair adminis-
tration of justice was not constitutionally grounded in the Sixth
Amendment.2 9 Hence, regardless of the balance that state courts
would otherwise strike based on state law between the interest of
the accused and that of the public, the federal balance may well be
weighted in favor of the defendant.
Exclusion of all or part of the public over defendant's objec-
tion has been strictly limited to special exceptions: witness protec-
291. Gannett, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. at 2905-06 (1979); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
583 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 and 270 n.25 (1948); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont.
205, 218, 156 P. 1080, 1084 (1916). In construing the public trial guarantee of the 1889 Mon-
tana Constitution the Montana Supreme Court stated that:
the public is interested in every criminal trial that court officers and jurors are
kept keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and the importance of their
functions, and interested spectators by their presence are the most important in-
fluence to accomplish this desired end.
Id.
292. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948), citing State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205,
156 P. 1080 (1916). In Keeler the Montana Supreme Court construed in what is arguably
dicta the public trial guarantee of the state constitution to implicate "questions of public
interests and concern." Id. at 218, 156 P. at 1083. The court stated, "The people are inter-
ested in knowing and have the right to know how their servants-the judge, county attor-
ney, sheriff, and clerk--conduct the public's business." Id. See also Shiras v. Britt, __
Ark. - 589 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1979). In holding that the Gannett decision permitting exclu-
sion of press and public did not apply to Arkansas, the court stated:
Courts operate for the benefit of the public . . .. When the public loses confi-
dence in the ability of the courts to fully and impartially deal with those accused
of crime, the public has a tendency to take the law into its own hands.
Id.
293. Gannett, - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 2905-06.
294. Id. at 2907. The majority contended that the public's interest in the administra-
tion of justice was protected by the participants in the litigation, i.e., by the judge, the
prosecutor, the accused and his counsel, and the jury. Id. The Montana Supreme Court has
construed the public trial guarantee of the 1889 state constitution as requiring the presence
of more than the participants:
It must be understood that the framers of our fundamental law understood that,
in order for a trial to be public, the attendance cannot be limited to those persons
whose presence would be necessary in order to conduct the trial.
State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 217, 156 P. 1080, 1083 (1916).
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tion is one.295 Presentation of particularly morbid subject matter is
another.296 Presentation of subject matter which is prurient in na-
ture has in some instances led to exclusion of the public when a
statute authorizing such an exclusion has existed, but the statutory
language has invariably been strictly construed and narrowly ap-
plied.2 97 As regards subject matter of "prurient" interest, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court followed such a strict construction in State v.
Keeler,98 a 1916 statutory rape case, holding that the public can-
not be excluded from criminal trials2 99 over the accused's objection.
The court referred to the predecessor of MCA § 3-1-313 (1979)
which allowed the court to exclude the public in certain enumer-
ated civil actions and to the public trial guarantee granted in Arti-
cle III, Section 16 of Montana's 1889 constitution00 and held that
The Constitution has declared for public trials in criminal cases,
and the legislature has said, in effect, that except in civil actions
enumerated, the doors of the courtroom shall be open during all
sittings of the court, and the power does not exist anywhere to
exclude from the courtroom any one sui juris who comes into the
presence of the Court when there are accommodations for him
301
The court stated that the guarantees of Article III, Section 16 of
the 1889 Constitution "were not intended as mere glittering gener-
alities . . . . It was never intended that these guarantees be ig-
nored, set aside or evaded. '30 2
While the Montana court in Keeler vindicated the defendant's
right to have his trial open to the public where the trial court had
closed the trial on account of the salacious nature of the case, the
Montana Supreme Court in what is arguably dicta also construed
the state constitutional guarantee to a public trial as belonging to
295. See, e.g., State v. Gee, 262 S.C. 373, 204 S.E.2d 727 (1974). See also State v.
Schmidt, 273 Minn. 78, 81, 139 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1966):
[T]he term "public" is relative and not defined .... Hence, courts uniformly
refuse to view the right to a public trial as absolute in the sense that everyone who
wishes to attend may do so. Rather, . . . it is generally viewed as a limited privi-
lege accorded to an accused, subject to the inherent power of the court to restrict
attendance as the conditions and circumstances reasonably require for the preser-
vation of order and decorum in the courtroom and to protect the rights of parties
and witnesses.
296. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. Buchanan, 22 Ariz. App. 521, 528 P.2d 1280
(1974).
297. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
298. 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916).
299. Id. at 215-18, 156 P. at 1082-84.
300. This section is identical to art. III, section 16 of the 1972 Montana Constitution.
301. 52 Mont. at 217-18, 156 P. at 1083.
302. Id. at 215, 156 P. at 1083.
1980]
43
Johnson and Joyce Johnson: Criminal Procedure
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1980
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the public generally as well as to the defendant personally:
In our judgment, the purpose of this constitutional provision is
threefold. Primarily it is for the benefit of the accused-to afford
him the means of proving a fact with reference to some question
of procedure which it may become necessary for him to prove in
order to protect his rights, and to see that he is not unjustly con-
demned .... But it likewise involves questions of public interest
and concern. The people are interested in knowing, and have the
right to know, how their servants-the judge, county attorney,
sheriff and clerk-conduct the public's business.03
The court reached that result in part by construing the numerical
predecessors of MCA §§ 3-1-312, -313 (1979), so4 which declare that
all court proceedings are to be public except in certain enumerated
civil cases, as a legislative implementation of the state public trial
guarantee.0 5 Declaring these statutes to be subject to the rule ex-
pressio unius exclusio alterius, the court concluded that the public
has a general right of access to criminal trials. 0 e They indicated,
nevertheless, that courts have the power to exclude disorderly or
dangerous persons in order to protect the due administration of
justice30 7 and, under some circumstances, to exclude minors.30,
If Montana adheres to the rationale of Keeler, the public may
well be accorded on state grounds the affirmative right of access to
criminal trials which has been denied under the Sixth Amendment
by the majority opinion in Gannett. Nevertheless, the public's
right of access may not be as absolute as a superficial reading of
Keeler may suggest. The Keeler court did say that the public trial
right had to be considered in the context of other constitutional
303. Id. at 218, 156 P. at 1083.
304. MCA § 3-1-312 (1979) provides: "The sittings of every court of justice must be
public, except as provided in 3-1-313." MCA § 3-1-313 (1979) provides:
(1) In an action for the dissolution of marriage, criminal conversation, or seduc-
tion, the court may direct the trial of any issue of fact joined therein to be private
and exclude all persons except the officers, the parties, their witnesses, and
counsel.
(2) During the examination of a witness in any cause, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, exclude some or all of the other witnesses in the cause.
305. 52 Mont. at 217-18, 156 P. at 1083.
306. Id. There is authority elsewhere construing statutory language similar to that of
the Montana statute to be merely repetitive of the accused's personal guarantee to a public
trial. United Press Assoc. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1954). But cf.
Quick, supra note 90, at 29-35 (arguing for public right of access to criminal proceedings);
Shiras v. Britt, __ Ark. 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979) (statute providing for all court pro-
ceedings to be open construed to prevent exclusion from pretrial hearings).
307. Id. at 216-17, 156 P. at 1083.
308. Id. at 217, 156 P. at 1083.
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provisions;309 it also deemed the state constitution's public trial
right as existing primarily for the defendant 1 0 and secondarily for
the public. 11 Should the public's statutory right of access to crim-
inal proceedings ever directly conflict with the defendant's right to
a fair trial, the public's right may have to yield. In Kirstowsky v.
Superior Court a California appellate court, while quoting approv-
ingly from State v. Keeler, held that the California parent statutes
to MCA §§ 3-1-312, -313 (1979) guaranteeing a public right of ac-
cess to the "sittings of every court of justice" must be subordi-
nated to "the higher right and duty of the court under the Consti-
tution to see to it that the defendant receives a fair trial and has a
fair opportunity to present his or her defense."31'
Whatever balance is struck on state grounds generally between
the public's right of access to criminal proceedings and the defen-
dant's fair trial right, Montana law clearly gives the defendant the
right to exclude the public from preliminary examinations. MCA §
46-10-201 (1979) provides:
The justice may, in his discretion, and must upon the request of
the defendant exclude from the preliminary examination every
person not officially associated with the case before the Court.
(emphasis added).
The statute embodies a significant exception to the general prac-
tice of public preliminary hearings in this country. Deriving from
the Field Code of Criminal Procedure, this provision allowing
closed preliminary hearings appears "in the statutory law of a nu-
merically small block of states."3 13 Of the sixteen to eighteen states
309. Id. at 216, 156 P. at 1083.
310. Id. at 218, 156 P. at 1083.
311. Id.
312. Kirstowsky v. Superior Ct., 143 Cal. App.2d 744, 300 P.2d 163, 169 (1956). Cf.
Shiras v. Britt, - Ark. -, 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979). Although the United States Supreme
Court held in Gannett that the press and public may be excluded from pretrial hearings, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held the same rule did not apply in that state due to the existence
of a statute declaring court proceedings to be open to the public:
[Als we view the issues before us, they are controlled by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-109
(Repl. 1962) which provides: "The sittings of every court shall be public and every
person may freely attend the same." . . . Courts operate for the benefit of the
public and like Caesar's wife should appear to be above reproach. When the public
loses confidence in the ability of the courts to fully and impartially deal with those
accused of crime, the public has a tendency to take the law into its own hands
.... Needless to say, we have concluded that the rights of the accused to a fair
and impartial trial do aot exceed the rights of the public to observe justice in
progress.
Id. at __, 589 S.W.2d at 18-19.
313. Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 397, 407 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Geis].
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which initially adopted parts or all of the Field Code, eight re-
tained intact this statute permitting closed hearings. 3 " Although
the issue has not frequently been litigated, reviewing courts have
upheld the defendant's right under the statute to exclude the pub-
lic and the press from his preliminary examination. 15 In People v.
Elliot,3" for example, the California Supreme Court construed the
statute as a legislative implementation of the accused's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.3 1 7 At preliminary
hearings the evidence is presented mainly by the prosecution in an
effort to convince the court that charges should be brought against
the defendant. Press coverage of that evidence could prejudice
members of the community from which the jury is drawn against
the accused.
Public exclusion is also consonant with a respect for the ac-
cused's right to remain silent in the face of his accuser. Press re-
ports of the accused's silence at preliminary hearing could conceiv-
ably prejudice prospective jurors against his cause. Despite a
provision in the California Constitution similar to that in MCA §
46-20-701 (1979) that no cause should be reversed for error unless
prejudice was shown to have resulted from the error, the California
Supreme Court in Elliot held that failure to grant a defendant's
motion to exclude the public from his preliminary examination was
the denial of a substantive right and was per se reversible error,
even without a showing of actual prejudice. 8 Because the statu-
tory guarantee would otherwise be meaningless, prejudice would be
presumed.31 9
Although the rules of criminal procedure provide for exclusion
314. Id. at 409. Those eight states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, New York,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Gannett referred to
the statutory practice of these eight states allowing exclusion of the public from preliminary
hearings as support for his argument that "[cilosed pretrial proceedings have been a famliar
part of the judicial landscape in this country" for a considerable time. - U.S. at -, 99
S.Ct. at 2911.
315. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal.2d 498, 324 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960); Azbill v.
Fisher, 84 Nev, 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968); see also State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d
115 (1968) (upholding as constitutional rule providing for mandatory exclusion from prelim-
inary hearings at defendant's request); see generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1007 (1973); Ran-
ney, supra note 12, at 829 n.48. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965), the Court noted:
It is contended that this two-day pretrial hearing cannot be considered in deter-
mining the question before us. We cannot agree. Pretrial [publicity] can create a
major problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed, it may be more harm-
ful than publicity during the trial for it may well set the community opinion as to
guilt or innocence.
316. 54 Cal.2d 498, 324 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960).
317. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal.2d 498, 324 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757 (1960).
318. Id. at 498, 324 P.2d at 229, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
319. Id.
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of the public from preliminary hearings, there are no provisions
specifically granting the accused similar rights in suppression or
other pretrial hearings. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
advocate the adoption of a rule that would permit exclusion of the
public from pretrial hearings generally, including suppression hear-
ings, whenever the dissemination of evidence or argument adduced
at the hearing might disclose matters that would be inadmissible
at the trial and would probably interfere with the defendant's right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury.-20 Where exclusion is ordered
the ABA Standards provide that a complete record of the proceed-
ings is to be kept and shall be made available to the public after
disposition of the case.321 In view of the rationale of Kirstowsky
that the public's statutory right of access to criminal proceedings
must be subordinated to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the
guidelines of the ABA Standards could be judicially applied to ex-
clude the public and the press from suppression hearings in appro-
priate cases. Under Kirstowsky, however, the exclusion may not be
more expansive than is absolutely necessary to protect the defen-
dant's fair trial right."' 2
A very recent Montana case may indicate, however, that the
public right of access to criminal proceedings is broader in Mon-
tana than in California. In Great Falls Tribune v. District Courts2 s
a three to two majority of the Montana Supreme Court emphati-
320. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 250, at § 3.1.
321. Id.
322. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App.2d 744, 300 P.2d 163, 169 (1956).
Arguably, the public right of access to criminal proceedings is broader in Montana than in
California due to the "right to know" provision of the state constitution which guarantees
the public a right "to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government." MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 9. It is, however, questionable whether the provision
can be construed as applying to criminal proceedings. The language of the section suggests
that it was intended to provide public access to lawmaking and rulemaking bodies such as
legislative committees and agencies. The provision expressly excepts "cases in which the
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." Even if the
"right to know" provision were interpreted to apply generally to criminal proceedings, it is
arguable that closure would be permissible under the privacy exception. Article II, section
10 of Montana's constitution provides that individual privacy should not be infringed ab-
sent a compelling state interest. On the basis of the right of privacy clause the Montana
Supreme Court has held that the accused's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures under Montana's constitution is greater than that afforded by the corresponding
guarantee in the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer,
- Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1977). Similarly, it is possible that Montana could
interpret the right of privacy clause as expanding the defendant's right to a fair trial under
the state constitution. If, indeed, the accused is surrounded by a presumption of innocence
until his guilt has been proven, the right of privacy could perforce mandate closure of some
pretrial hearings to prevent prejudicing potential jurors. The public's interest would be safe-
guarded by releasing the pretrial transcript after the jury had been empanelled or after trial.
323. - Mont. - , - P.2d - , 37 St. Rptr. 502 (1980).
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cally recognized an independent right of access to judicial proceed-
ings."' The court set forth a full written opinion in support of its
antecedent issuance of a writ of supervisory control vacating a trial
court closure of voir dire proceedings to the public. The majority
viewed the "right to know" provision of the state constitution
which guarantees the public.a right "to observe the deliberations
of all public bodies or agencies of state government"3 25 as creating
a public right of access even though the Sixth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution created none. Applying the plain meaning
rule, the court declined to construe the state constitutional provi-
sion with the aid of the rules of statutory construction.32  It found
that "[t]he language of this provision speaks for itself"3  and that
it applied "to all public bodies of the state and its subdivisions
without exception. '3 2 8 Nevertheless, the majority conceded that
"this right of access or right to know is not absolute."' 9 It must be
balanced against the defendant's right to a speedy public trial.330
Under the factual circumstances presented in the instant case, the
court found the public's right prevailed over the defendant's. The
majority appears to have been influenced in its decision primarily
by three factors. First, it considered the news accounts dealing
with the brutal homicide and rape allegedly committed by the de-
fendant to be neither so inflammatory nor pervasive as to threaten
defendant's fair trial right. 31 Secondly, the court maintained that
324. Id. at - , - P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 505.
325. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. That provision provides in full:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivi-
sions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds
the merits of public disclosure.
See Great Falls Tribune v. District Ct., - Mont. , P.2d - , 37 St. Rptr. 502,
505 (1980) (court recognition of privacy exception to right-to-know provision).
326. Id. at , P.2d at - , 37 St. Rptr. at 505.
327. Id.
328. Id. The majority declared closure to be "simply censorship at the source-a de-
nial of the right to know." Id. at - , - P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 506. The court
viewed closure as frequently being counterproductive because "it focuses public attention on
the accused and the crime by generating publicity which neither would otherwise merit." Id.
329. Id. at , P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 506.
330. Id.
331. Id. In dissent, Justice Sheehy asserted that whether or not the press misrepre-
sented the purported facts of the crime was irrelevant to determining whether voir dire
should be closed: "What must be examined is whether or not the facts of the crime as
printed or broadcast, true or false, make it likely that an impartial jury cannot be em-
paneled in the area from which a jury will be drawn." It is difficult to comprehend, however,
how closure of voir dire to the press and public remedies prior adverse publicity. At a later
point in his dissent, Justice Sheehy suggested that access by the public and press to voir
dire could affect the "candor and willingness" of the prospective jurors to respond openly to
questions if their names, addresses, and answers were exposed to the public. Id. at -,
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the Montana Constitution imposed a stricter standard in order to
authorize closure than does the Federal Constitution due to the
fact that the Federal Constitution has no counterpart to the Mon-
tana "right to know" provision. 32 Thirdly, the majority found the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Gannett to be inappli-
cable.33 Gannett allowed the closure of a pretrial suppression
hearing; the present case involved "closure of the entire voir dire
examination of all prospective jurors."3 34 The Montana court ac-
knowledged that "suppression hearings involve a special risk [of]
disclosure of tainted evidence."338 But, in the court's view, the ra-
tionale of Gannett could not be extended to justify closure of the
trial itself, of which voir dire is a part: "Closing any part of trial is
simply the first step down that primrose path that leads to de-
struction of those societal values that open public trials promote.
Nothing short of strict and irreparable necessity to ensure defen-
dant's right to a fair trial should suffice.""'
In dissent, Justice Sheehy cautioned against fashioning on
state grounds an absolute right of access to all criminal proceed-
ing.3 37 For Montana's "right to know" clause may not vitiate the
substantive guarantees of the Sixth Amendment of the federal con-
stitution.33 8 If the public right of access under state law and the
defendant's right to a fair trial ever conflict, the supremacy clause
mandates that federal law prevail.339 Insistence upon public access
to all criminal pretrial hearings regardless of the prejudicial effect
on the accused would ultimately result in some reversals by appel-
late courts for denial of accused's federal fair trial right.
V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Standing
In a recent case the United States Supreme Court purportedly
fashioned a new test to determine whether a defendant is the
proper party to challenge the legality of a police search or seizure
and to invoke the exclusionary remedy. For reasons to be discussed
there is no reason for Montana courts to adopt the Supreme
- P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 518.
332. Id. at , P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 506.
333. Id. at , - P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 507.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at , P.2d at -, 37 St. Rptr. at 519 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
338. Id.
339. Id.
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Court's rationale. The ability to challenge the constitutionality of
police practices is commonly denoted as one of the standing of the
moving party to raise the Fourth Amendment claim. In order to
have standing the party seeking relief must have an adversary
stake in the outcome.3 40 A criminal defendant's personal stake in
avoiding conviction does not suffice. The United States Supreme
Court has refused to extend standing generally to everyone against
whom illegally seized evidence is admitted, as a matter of constitu-
tional interpretation and as a matter of policy. As is true of consti-
tutional rights generally, 41 Fourth Amendment rights are consid-
ered personal rights and may only be asserted by those whose
rights are violated. 42 The claimant must himself have been the
"victim" of the search or seizure. 4 3 As a matter of policy the Court
has refused to confer standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amend-
ment claims in order to avoid a more widespread invocation of the
exclusionary rule in criminal trials.34 4 Expanded application of the
exclusionary rule would result in relevant and reliable evidence be-
ing kept from the trier of fact more frequently. 3M The function of
the jury as the seeker of truth would be severly impeded 46 in cases
which reap no commensurate benefits by way of deterrence of ille-
gal police activity.3 47 Montana follows the same general rule as the
340. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court explained that requir-
ing the party to demonstrate "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" is in-
tended "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id.
at 204; see generally 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 11.3 at 543 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as LAFAVE].
341. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
342. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
343. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
344. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). The Court expressly recognized the
propriety of considering policy in determining the scope of the standing rule. It stated that
"misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who may invoke [the exclu-
sionary) rule are properly considered when deciding whether to expand standing to assert
Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 138.
345. 439 U.S. at 137.
346. Id.
347. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). There the Court stated
that its standing rule "is premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence and hence
the rationale for excluding evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct
would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search." Id. Since its
inception the exclusionary rule has served two basic functions. The first is the deterrence of
lawless police conduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The second is the preservation
of "judicial integrity" by preventing "unhindered government use of the fruits" of invasions
of the constitutional rights of the citizens. Id. at 12-13. Nevertheless the Court has held that
"the proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked demands a con-
stant awareness of [its] limitations." Id. at 14. Regardless of how effective it is where the
objective of the police is obtaining convictions, "it is powerless to deter invasions of consti-
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United States Supreme Court that for standing purposes the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizures is a personal right only.3 4 8
The Court has not been altogether consistent in defining just
who is a victim of a search or seizure so as to have standing. At
times the Court has linked standing to property concepts, indicat-
ing that standing is acquired by having a proprietary or possessory
interest in the premises3 49 searched or a property interest in the
items seized.3 50 At other times the Court has been critical of such
an approach. In Jones v. United States,38 ' for example, the Court
rejected "any reliance upon the subtle distinctions of the common
law regarding private property, concluding instead that 'anyone le-
gitimately on the premises where a search occurs' has standing. 35 2
tutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting while
willing to forego successful prosecution in pursuit of some other goal," for example unrea-
sonable harassment of unpopular minorities. Id. Thus, the Court has concluded that "a rigid
and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which
it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frus-
tration of efforts to prevent crime." Id. at 15. The exclusionary rule is, however, arguably an
effective remedy in situations where police "conduct unconstitutional searches against small
fish in order to catch big ones." Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 433. Precisely
due to the danger that police may be willing to make such trade-offs, Justice Fortas in his
dissent in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) advocated granting standing to a
defendant whenever government agents conducted their unlawful search and seizure to ob-
tain evidence to use against him. Id. at 208-09. Nevertheless, Fortas's position that anyone
who is the "target" of an illegal search or seizure possesses standing should be considered
with the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule in mind. There would only be sufficient
reason to adopt a target-standing rule if it could be shown to further the deterrence objec-
tive of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 3 LAFAvE, supra note 340, at 600. The
Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), however, squarely rejected the defendant's
target-standing theory on grounds that such an expanded standing rule would result in ex-
panded use of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. Id. at 137.
348. State v. Tritz, 164 Mont. 344, 351, 522 P.2d 603, 607 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
909 (1974); see also State v. Azure, - Mont. - , 591 P.2d 1125, 1131-32 (1979) (one
neither injured nor jeopardized by the operation of a statute has no standing to challenge its
constitutionality); State v. Kirkland, - Mont. - , 602 P.2d 586, 590-91 (1979).
349. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); see also LAFAvE, supra note 1, §
11.3 at 544.
350. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1951). See generally Annot., 78
A.L.R.2d 246, 248-49 (1961) (generally defendant must show interest in premises searched
or property seized to have standing).
351. 362 U.S. 257 (1962).
352. Id. at 266; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968). In Jones, the
Court set forth two alternate bases for standing. First, it held that anyone legitimately on
the premises where a search occurs could challenge its legality by means of a motion to
suppress. 362 U.S. at 266-67. Thus a person aggrieved by a purportedly illegal search could
acquire standing by demonstrating an "interest in connection with the searched premises
that gave rise 'to a reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion' upon
those premises." Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting
from Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)). One such qualifying interest was owner-
ship of the property. According to the Jones rationale, another was the claimant's legitimate
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Jones held that a person who had been permitted to use a friend's
apartment for the night had standing to object to its search by
federal narcotics agents.35 3 In Mancusi v. DeForte354 the Court
finally arrived at a general standard against which all of its prior
standing pronouncements would be measured. The Court there
held "that capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amend-
ment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but
upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. ' ' s 5
presence in the searched premises.
Secondly, Jones established a rule of "automatic standing" to contest an allegedly ille-
gal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of
the offense charged. 362 U.S. at 263-64. Prior to Jones a defendant charged with a posses-
sory offense (e.g., drug possession) was faced with a dilemma if he wished to challenge evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search. He could assert a proprietary interest in the incriminat-
ing evidence in order to have standing to contest the illegal search or seizure. He would then
be faced with the possibility that the allegations made on the motion to suppress could be
issued against him at trial. The "possession" requirement also encouraged defendants to
perjure themselves to attain "standing." On the other hand, the defendant could choose to
forgo any Fourth Amendment challenge to the evidence and contend at trial that he had not
owned or possessed the evidence. In that event the objectionable evidence would certainly
reach the jury. The prosecution was given the "advantage of contradictory positions as a
basis for conviction." In Jones, 362 U.S. at 263, defendant's conviction flowed from his pos-
session of the contraband at the time of search. Yet the fruits of the search were admitted
into evidence on the grounds defendant did not have possession of the drugs at that time.
Id. The "automatic standing" rule of Jones eliminated the requirement of alleging posses-
sion. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Court subsequently held that
the testimony of a defendant adduced at a pretrial hearing in support of a motion to sup-
press could not thereafter be admitted against him at trial if the defendant objects.
Whether the holding in Simmons has eliminated the need for Jones's automatic standing
has not been decided by the Court. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1973);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135 n.4 (1978).
353. 362 U.S. at 267.
354. 392 U.S. 364 (1967). In Mancusi the Court held that a person could have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a shared office space even though there was no expectation
of absolute privacy.
355. Id. at 368. The Court in Mancusi thus adopted essentially the same reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test for determining standing that it had adopted in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), for determining whether a search has occurred. As Professor
LaFave has noted, the various standing tests of the Court are not necessarily in conflict:
"The fundamental inquiry regarding standing is that articulated in Mancusi: whether the
conduct which the defendant wants to put in issue involved an intrusion into his reasonable
expectation of privacy." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, § 11.3 at 544.
In the Katz decision the United States Supreme Court held that electronic monitoring
of a telephone booth without an actual physical intrusion or "trespass" into the booth was a
"search" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because it "violated the privacy upon
which [the user of the booth] . . . justifiably relied." 389 U.S. at 353. Starting with the
premise that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id. at 351, the Court
concluded that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," id., whereas "what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in a area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected." Id. at 351-52. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have generally followed the Katz
52
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In a controversial five to four decision, the Court last term re-
jected the "legitimately on the premises" standing formulation of
Jones. 50 In Rakas v. Illinois a5 an officer had received a radio re-
port of a robbery and stopped what he believed to be the getaway
car. After ordering the occupants out of the car, he searched its
interior, finding a sawed-off rifle under the front seat and rifle
shells in the glove compartment. The defendants conceded that
they did not own the vehicle but were merely passengers. Neither
did they assert ownership of the rifle or the shells. The defendants
argued "that their occupancy of the automobile. . was compara-
ble to that of Jones in the apartment. 358 The Court disagreed.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, abandoned the
"legitimately on the premises" standard of Jones in favor of an
inquiry into whether the defendant had a "legitimate expectation
of privacy" in the places searched. In taking this action, Justice
Rehnquist purported to be eliminating the traditional standing in-
quiry and to be subsuming it under the substantive Fourth
Amendment protection.3 5 In the majority's view, a literal applica-
privacy test in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. See Amsterdam,
Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358. The Katz test is often described as an inquiry into
whether the individual whose interests are affected by a government intrusion had a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy." "Expectation" is not a term used by Justice Stewart in his
majority opinion. Subsequent cases, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), bor-
rowed the formulation from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. He used it to denote a two-
pronged inquiry into whether the defendant had (1) "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" which (2) "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361.
356. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
357. 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
358. Id. at 141.
359. Id. at 138-40. He asserted that it served no analytical purpose to consider the
principle that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights as a matter of standing. Id. at
138. Instead he concluded, "[T]he better analysis focused forthrightly on the extent of a
particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment rather than on any theoretically
separate but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Id. at 139. See also Note, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1, 172 (1979). The Court's purported elimination of the standing question in
the context of the Fourth Amendment is unlikely to have much practical effect. The Court's
action was undoubtedly motivated by the fact that the inquiry into both the standing and
the substantive Fourth Amendment rights of the claimant are governed by the same Katz-
Mancusi privacy standard. Nevertheless the Court still will have to determine whether the
complaining party had a Fourth Amendment interest impinged by the search (traditional
standing) before inquiring whether the search was "reasonable" (the substantive inquiry).
See Note, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 176 (1979). Indeed, the Court in Rakas engaged solely in the
former of those two inquiries which amounted to nothing more than an examination of
whether the defendants had traditional standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. Fur-
thermore, the Court is technically incorrect when it equates standing with the substantive
inquiry. The standing inquiry has always focused on whether the police intruded on the
particular defendant's justified expectation of privacy. The substantive Fourth Amendment
question whether the police intruded on anyone's justified expectation of privacy, i.e.
whether a search or seizure has occurred, is a separate inquiry. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note
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tion of the Jones standard created "too broad a gauge for the mea-
surement of Fourth Amendment rights."360 It did not in all in-
stances accurately indicate whether the claimant had an
expectation of privacy in the place searched legitimately deserving
of substantive Fourth Amendment protection." 1 Applying the sub-
stantive "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard, the Court
held that the defendants did not have the requisite privacy inter-
est "in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in
which they were merely passengers."" The only reason given for
this holding was that defendants "asserted neither a property nor a
possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the prop-
erty seized.53
In the name of developing the Katz privacy test, the Court in
Rakas instead revived the pre-Katz "protected areas" thinking,
emphasizing "the centrality of ownership and possession by explic-
itly investing only the owner/possessor with a clear legitimate ex-
pectation" of privacy. 3" While Justice Rehnquist said that an indi-
vidual's legitimate presence would not be totally irrelevant for
Fourth Amendment analysis, he did not consider that factor at all
340, § 11.3 at 57 (Supp. 1980).
360. 439 U.S. at 142.
361. Id. at 140-48. That the Jones standard was no litmus-paper test indicating the
presence of Fourth Amendment rights was shown by the widely divergent results in lower
court decisions. Id. at 145.
362. 439 U.S. at 148.
363. Id. The Court's analysis is conclusory, assuming that nothing but a property in-
terest in the car could give rise to a "legitimate" expectation of privacy. The Court stated
that the area under the seats and the glove compartment, "[l1ike the trunk of an automobile
... are areas in which a passenger qua pasasenger would not normally have a legitimate
expectation of privacy." Id. at 148-49. The majority opinion distinguished both Katz and
Jones in which the defendants had been found to have the required expectation of privacy
in a phone booth and an apartment, respectively. The claimants in those cases, in contrast
to the passenger in Rakas, had complete dominion and control over the area searched and
could exclude others from the area. It is unclear what substantial difference exists between
the factual situations in Katz and Jones, on the one hand, and that in Rakas on the other.
Katz merely entered a phone booth and shut the door. Jones acquired a key to a friend's
apartment and spent the night there. Rakas entered a friend's car and shut the door. It
would seem that Rakas and his cohorts had just as much power to exclude others.
In dissent, Justice White accused the majority of holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects "property not people." 439 U.S. 156 (White, J., dissenting). Referring to a line of
cases in which people in taxicabs, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), phone booths,
Katz v. United States, 384 U.S. 347 (1967), and friends' apartments, Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960), had been permitted to challenge searches, the dissent concluded the
majority could have only reached its results by reintroducing long-abandoned property con-
cepts into Fourth Amendment analysis.
364. Note, 93 HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 178 (1979). The Court, invoking the Katz privacy stan-
dard, has gradually shifted the requisite "privacy reliance" from "justifiable" to "reasona-
ble" to "legitimate," and in the process has moved conceptually farther from the perspective
of the individual and closer to the perspective of the government. Id. at 179-80.
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in evaluating the Rakas facts. Indeed, the Court in Rakas aban-
doned legitimate presence altogether as an analytical tool in decid-
ing the case. As one commentator has pointed out, "[T]he only in-
terests specifically given a clear stamp of legitimacy in Rakas are
those based on property and related concepts of property con-
trol. 3 5 In the majority's view, "concepts of real or personal prop-
erty law" were a major source of the legitimization of privacy
interests86
There is an underlying irony in the majority's reliance on the
Katz-based privacy test. In Katz, the Supreme Court departed
from the "constitutionally protected areas" standard applied in
prior cases in order to determine whether the particular intrusions
by the sovereign into individual interests were violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Katz purported to do away with all simplistic
property-related formulas with the observation that they cannot
"serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment prob-
lem. 3 67 The Court's holding in Rakas is a departure from a long
line of cases which have refused to recognize proprietary interests
as the only basis of constitutional analysis.3' s By viewing the con-
cept of legitimate presence as independent of the Katz standard
rather than as a component of it as suggested by Justice Powell's
concurrence, 869 the majority missed the opportunity to provide a
principled test for applying the general privacy standard of
Katz.37 0 The majority's apparent regard of property as the sole
touchstone of privacy threatens a return to a talismanic, one-di-
mensional view of the Fourth Amendment just as much as does the
dissent's advocacy of a literal application of the Jones "presence"
standard. 71
365. Id. at 178.
366. 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12. While stressing in his concurring opinion that "no single
factor should invariably be determinative in applying the legitimate expectation of privacy
test," id. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring), and while suggesting several criteria in addition to
proprietary interests, id. at 152-53, Justice Powell nevertheless viewed property interests as
an important criterion: "[P]roperty rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's
authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in deter-
mining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Id. at 153.
367. 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
368. See, e.g., Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (per curiam); Mancusi
v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-69 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
369. 439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring); see note 366 supra.
370. The Court in Katz conspicuously avoided identifying the privacy interests pro-
tected by the amendment. See Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 365; Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
371. Any literal application of the "legitimately on the premises" language which ex-
tends the coverage of the Fourth Amendment beyond the range of Katz would be invalid.
1980]
55
Johnson and Joyce Johnson: Criminal Procedure
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1980
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Notwithstanding the majority's observation "that cars are not
to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth
Amendment purposes,"87 the Court's rejection of the "legitimately
on the premises" formulation is not without implications for
searches of dwellings. Justice Rehnquist asserted that petitioners'
claim would fail "even in an analogous situation in a dwelling
place ' 7 because defendants had made no showing that they had a
"legitimate expectation of privacy," in the places searched.87' At an
earlier point he wrote that the literal application of the "legiti-
mately on the premises" standard would permit the most casual
visitor to object to a search of the basement in which he had never
been if he merely happened to be in the kitchen at the time of the
search.8 75 Similarly it would permit a challenge by a person who
walked into the house one minute before a search commenced and
left one minute after it ended. 76 This and other comments in
Rakas might lead one to conclude that only a regular resident or a
person with complete dominion and control over the house would
have standing to challenge the legality of a search of the premises
while he is present. As one writer has noted, such an unsound rule
is not mandated by Rakas, "for the approach of the four dissenters
and the two concurring justices points the other way. "a77 As the
concurring opinion 7 8 and dissent8 79 recognized, the Fourth
Amendment guards the security of the person as well as posses-
sions. That aspect of the amendment was not placed in issue since
petitioners did not challenge "the constitutionality of the police
action in stopping the automobile in which they were riding; nor
[did] they complain of being made to get out of the vehicle." s80
Defendants only attempted to challenge the subsequent search.
Clearly the defendants would have had standing to challenge the
intrusion upon their personal freedom resulting from the police's
action in stopping their car and ejecting them from it.8s1 Notwith-
See Note, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 177 (1979); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-70 (1968);
Id. at 375-76 (Black, J., dissenting); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and
Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 345-46 (1970); Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing
Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421, 448 (1975).
372. 439 U.S. at 148.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 142.
376. Id.
377. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, § 11.3 at 59 (Supp. 1980).
378. 439 U.S. at 150-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
379. Id. at 156-69 (White, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 150-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
381. See United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. ordered, 600
384 [Vol. 41
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standing Rakas, therefore, a passenger in a car or a momentary
visitor to a house or apartment has standing to challenge alleged
unconstitutional seizures of their persons. A passenger in a car may
also have standing to object to a vehicle search if his personal
property is in the car.""' The Court emphasized that the holding
was not to be read as implying "that such visitors could not con-
test the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their
own property were seized in the search."3831
In Montana the effect of Rakas may be somewhat limited. The
Montana Supreme Court has construed the right to privacy provi-
sion"' of the Montana constitution as affording an individual more
protection against unreasonable search and seizure than is in-
cluded in Fourth Amendment concepts of privacy.38 5 Thus, as the
decided cases in Montana suggest, 88 Montana law may well recog-
nize a legitimate expectation of privacy in circumstances where
federal law acknowledges none. It is quite likely that the Montana
court would not limit legitimate privacy interests under state law
to property-related concepts such as possession, dominion, or con-
trol. There is therefore no reason for Montana courts to look to
Rakas for guidance in determining who has standing to object to
purportedly illegal searches or seizures.
F.2d 18 (1979) (Noting that Rakas did not apply to this question, the Court assumed that
passengers on a vessel had standing to object to the Coast Guard's stopping and boarding of
the ship.).
382. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, § 11.3 at 66 (Supp. 1980); but see State v. List, 166
N.J. Super. 368, 399 A.2d 1040 (1979).
383. 439 U.S. at 142 n.11.
384. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
385. See State v. Sawyer, - Mont. - , 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1977) ("We need not
consider the Fourth Amendment issue because we view the Montana Constitution to afford
an individual greater protection in this instance than is found under the Fourth Amend-
ment in Opperman."); State v. Brackman, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1978)
(The standard necessary to justify police invasion of "individual privacy" is a showing of a
"compelling state interest," not one of "probable cause."); see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (The protection of a person's general right to privacy is left to
the law of the individual states.); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (A state may
impose greater restrictions on police activity than the United States Supreme Court has
deemed necessary on federal constitutional grounds.).
386. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, - Mont. - , 571 P.2d 1131 (1977) (holding an
inventory search of defendant's automobile violative of defendant's right to privacy; the
United States Supreme Court had upheld such an inventory search in South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)); State v. Brackman, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978)
(holding "consensual participant monitoring" violative of defendant's state-guaranteed right
to privacy where under identical facts the United States Supreme Court had upheld the use
of miniaturized radio equipment concealed on a police informer whose conversations with
the defendant were simultaneously transmitted to monitoring government agents. United
States v. White, 402 U.S. 745 (1971)).
19801 385
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B. Developments Relating to the Scope of the Privacy
Standard
Recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court portend
to erode the substantive protection afforded by the Fourth Amend-
ment by attenuating the scope of the privacy standard established
by United States v. Katz. 8 7 In Katz the United States Supreme
Court departed from the "constitutionally protected areas" or tres-
pass standard applied in prior cases 88 in order to determine
whether a given activity of the sovereign constituted a search.389 In
Katz the Court held that the electronic monitoring of a telephone
booth without an actual physical intrusion or "trespass" into the
booth constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendments" because it "violated the privacy upon which
[the user of the booth] . . . justifiably relied."391 Starting with the
premise that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,"' ' the Court concluded that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection,"393 whereas "what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.' '8
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have generally fol-
lowed Katz in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. 95 The Katz test is often described as an inquiry into
whether the individual whose interests are affected by a govern-
ment intrusion had a "reasonable expectation of privacy." "Expec-
tation" is not a term used by Justice Stewart in his majority opin-
387. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
388. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
389. As used in the Fourth Amendment context the term "search" does not refer to a
particular way in which the government invades constitutionally protected interests; it is
rather "a description of the conclusion that such interests have been invaded." Amsterdam,
Perspectives, supra note 62, at 385. The Montana Supreme Court, however, has defined a
"search" more mechanistically as "an examination of one's prenises or person with a view
to the discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a crimi-
nal action; it implies an exploratory investigation or quest." State v. Williams, 153 Mont.
262, 269, 455 P.2d 634, 638 (1969). The most important element of the Williams test is that
the police officer be acting with the intention to find evidence; otherwise there is no search
within the definition of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Braden, 154 Mont. 90, 96-97, 460
P.2d 85, 88 (1969); State v. Emerson, 169 Mont. 284, 286-87, 546 P.2d 509, 510 (1976).
390. 389 U.S. at 353.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 351.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 351-52.
395. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358.
[Vol. 41
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ion. Subsequent cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio s9 borrowed
the formulation from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. He ex-
plained the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as a two-fold
inquiry into whether (1) the claimant had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy, (2) that society was prepared to recognize
as reasonable.3 17 Implicit in this two-pronged test is a certain ten-
sion or balancing of priorities between what the individual subjec-
tively expects in the way of privacy on the one hand and what the
court thinks that society is willing to grant him in this regard on
the other.398 In striking a balance between individual and societal
396. 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
397. 389 U.S. at 361.
398. An actual, subjective expectation of privacy would obviously be a totally inade-
quate standard. As noted by Professor Anthony Amsterdam, if such a standard were in
effect, the government "could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade
and that we are all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance."
Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358.
In applying the privacy standard the Court has indeed purported to consider what soci-
ety will accept as "reasonable" without making a systematic, principled attempt to identify
what individual privacy interests are protected. In balancing the individual's interests in
being free from government intrusion against society's interest in making an intrusion, the
Court has interjected policy considerations, most notably a concern for effective law enforce-
ment, into the privacy test of Katz. In order to determine whether a warrant should have
been required under the factual situation in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), for
example, Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion advocated that the nature of a particular
police procedure and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security be
balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement. Id. at 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The case involved the use of miniaturized radio equipment con-
cealed on a police informer whose conversations with the defendant were simultaneously
transmitted to recording equipment and to monitoring agents. The majority analyzed the
situation as substantially like a conversation between two persons, one of whom later de-
cides to relate what the other had said to the police, and held that the defendant had "no
justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he is con-
versing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police." Id. at 749.
In State v. Brackman, - Mont. - , 582 P.2d 1216 (1978), under facts identical to
those in United States v. White, the Montana Supreme Court struck down police use of
warrantless "consensual participant monitoring," i.e., the use of electronic surveillance
equipment concealed on a police informer whose conversations with the defendant are si-
multaneously transmitted to concealed agents. The court held that electronic interception
by third parties of conversations between individuals who neither consent to nor know of
the interception was a violation of their right to privacy guaranteed by the Montana Consti-
tution. Moreover, a "compelling state interest" was held to be required under Montana's
constitutional right of privacy before participant electronic monitoring could be conducted.
In State v. Hanley, - Mont. -, - P.2d -, 37 St. Rptr. 427 (1980) (opinion after
rehearing) the court approved of the procedure whereby officers obtained a search warrant
prior to engaging in participant electronic monitoring. The court did not make clear what
showing was required to obtain such a search warrant, whether of "probable cause" or
"compelling state interest." Brackman would seem, however, to impose the latter require-
ment. The standard of "compelling state interest" is admittedly vague. Nevertheless there
are indications that it may not impose a heavy burden on the state. In Zander v. District
Court, - Mont. - , 591 P.2d 656 (1979), the court held that there was no impermissible
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interests the Court has gradually shifted the requisite degree of
privacy reliance from "justifiable"' '  to "reasonable"'' 0  to "legiti-
mate. '40 1 The result has been that the Court has moved farther
from the perspective of the individual and closer to the perspective
of the government.0 2
This shift in perspective is evidenced in the Court's most re-
cent decisions on Fourth Amendment issues. In Rakas v. Illi-
nois,0 3 the Supreme Court held that passengers of an automobile
who assert neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest in the
automobile or in the property seized therefrom have no legitimate
expectation of privacy sufficient to allow them to challenge a pur-
portedly illegal search of the vehicle by police officers.' 0 ' The Court
thus returned to pre-Katz property-related concepts such as own-
ership, possession, dominion, and control in order to define what
sort of subjective expectations of privacy society is prepared to ac-
knowledge as legitimate. 5 While rejecting the concept of "consti-
tutionally protected areas" as a "talismanic solution to every
Fourth Amendment problem1' '1 0 6 Katz did not completely repudi-
ate the concept. It therefore remained unclear to what extent the
infringement of the right of privacy guaranteed under Article II, section 10 of Montana's
constitution where an officer acting pursuant to a reasonable belief that a burglary was in
progress entered the defendant's trailer without a warrant and inadvertantly discovered ma-
rijuana in the closet. The court found a "compelling state interest" sufficient to infringe
upon the defendant's right of privacy in the state's interest in protecting the home and
property of its citizens from unlawful intrusion. In light of this opinion, it is conceivable
that the court would find the state's interest in enforcing its laws to be a "compelling state
interest" which would permit issuance of a search warrant to allow participant electronic
monitoring.
399. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 748-49 (1971).
400. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (per curiam).
401. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1976); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143, 143-44 n.12 (1978); Smith v. Maryland, - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2581-83
(1979).
402. Note, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 180 (1979). "The concept of 'justifiable reliance,' which
occupied the central role in the Katz majority opinion, appears based on a claim of right by
the citizen against governmental intrusion. See Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at
385. The introduction of 'reasonable expectation' as the standard produced a subtle shift in
perspective, to a claim of right that society would match against the spectrum of legal alter-
natives and determine to be permissible for the typical citizen. [See 1 LAFAVE, supra note
340, at 230-31.] With 'legitimate expectation' appears to come a still more pronounced shift:
society, through the courts, defines what a citizen may expect from the government." Id. at
180 n.72.
403. 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see notes 340-84 supra and accompanying text.
404. 439 U.S. at 148.
405. Id. at 143-44 n.12.
406. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967).
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privacy formulation of Katz supplanted earlier doctrines.0 7 Rakas
indicates not only that the Katz privacy test did not completely
supersede the trespass standard of prior case law, but it also sug-
gests that a narrow majority of the Court now regards "constitu-
tionally protected areas" as a main ingredient of the Katz-based
"expectation of privacy" standard.
In the somewhat related decision of Arkansas v. Sanders""
the United States Supreme Court last term found an expectation
of privacy deserving of Fourth Amendment protection in personal
luggage being transported in an automobile.40 9 "Indeed," the Court
explained, "the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a reposi-
tory for personal items when one wishes to transport them."' 4 0 The
Court's rationale is thus consistent with the property-related anal-
ysis of the privacy test in Rakas. The Court's broader holding in
Sanders was that the automobile exception to the search warrant
requirement does not extend to luggage seized from a legally
stopped vehicle even if police officers have probable cause to stop
the vehicle and to search its interior."' The Court found that the
reasons for not requiring a warrant for vehicular stops and
searches do not apply to personal luggage taken from the automo-
bile by police.' 1 '
Since Katz rejected "talismanic" analysis of the Fourth
Amendment, it would seem that technical considerations of notice,
either actual or constructive, of certain government activities
would not, by themselves, preclude the existence of a reasonable
407. See Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358. Katz itself expressly states
that the Fourth Amendment's protections go further than individual privacy and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all. 389 U.S. at 350.
408. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979).
409. Id. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 2593.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 2593-94. The Court enumerated two reasons for treating automobiles differ-
ently than other property. "First, as the Court has repeatedly recognized, the inherent mo-
bility of automobiles makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. [citations omitted.] In ad-
dition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles may dilute the reasonable
expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property." Citing
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Id. at 2591. See generally, Criminal Law Survey:
Exclusionary Rule, 40 MoNT. L. REv. 132, 142-43 (1979). In Arkansas v. Sanders, - U.S.
- 99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979), the Supreme Court gave two reasons for requiring a warrant to
search luggage taken from an automobile. First, once the police have seized the luggage its
mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken.°The police can then
delay the luggage search until they secure a warrant without endangering themselves or
without risking the loss of the evidence. Secondly, luggage taken from an automobile
stopped on the highway is not attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than luggage
taken from any other location. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. at 2593-94.
1980] 389
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expectation of privacy."" Yet, the Court employed just such an
"advance-notice" and "assumption of risk" analysis in the recent
decision of Smith v. Maryland.41 4 The Court there held that the
telephone company's installation at police request of a pen register
to record numbers dialed from the defendant's telephone was not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and hence
no warrant was required. It first determined that telephone sub-
scribers harbor no general expectations that the numbers they dial
will remain secret. 6 The majority opinion then pronounced that
even if the defendant did harbor a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, it would not be one that society is prepared to accept as rea-
sonable,'1 since a person has no "legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third persons."'4 8 In
this regard the Court held that the defendant "assumed the risk"
that the phone company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed.1 9
Justice Marshall in dissent attacked the majority's risk analy-
sis of Fourth Amendment rights. He argued that "those who dis-
close facts to a bank or a phone company for a limited business
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other reasons"'20 without compliance with the
warrant requirement. Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk,
he contended, is the concept of choice. Unless one is willing to
forgo altogether use of telephone equipment, which has for many
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot avoid the
413. If notice could defeat judicial recognition of the requisite privacy expectation, the
government could erode the Fourth Amendment protection afforded the citizenry by "an-
nouncing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced..." by a few years and
that we would henceforth be subject to significant government surveillance. Amsterdam,
Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358.
414. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979).
415. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2580-83.
416. Id. at 99 S.Ct. at 2581. According to the majority, all telephone subscribers
realize that the phone company has the facilities for making permanent records of the num-
bers that they dial because they see a list of their long-distance and toll calls on their
monthly bills. Id. Customers are thus on notice of the company's practice of recording the
numbers they dial for business purposes. The Court also found that notice sufficient to de-
feat any subjective expectation of privacy in dialed numbers is furnished by the "Consumer
Information" section of "most" telephone books which informs customers that the phone
company "'can frequently help in identifying to authorities the origin of unwelcome and
troublesome calls.'" Id.
417. Id. at 258?.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
421. Id.
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risk of surveillance.2 More fundamentally, making risk analysis
"dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations
would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protections."' 2 Justice Marshall's criticism of the majority's
rationale is sound and convincing. If the Katz-based privacy stan-
dard is to become more than a rubber stamp of approval for any
forewarned government intrusion into individual interests, and if it
is to implement the ostensible protective purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court must enunciate a principled method for
determining what individual interests warrant a recognized expec-
tation of privacy.'2 '
422. Id.
423. Id. Law enforcement officials could simply put the public on notice of the risks
they assume in communication simply by announcing their intent to randomly monitor sam-
ples of first class mail or private telephone conversations. Id. In Marshall's view the legiti-
macy of privacy interest within the meaning of Katz "depends not on the risks an individual
can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he
should be forced to assume in a free and open society." Id.
424. Indeed Katz went "to pains to avoid" identifying the privacy interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note C2, at 365; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). The majority in Smith purported to invoke Harlan's
two-pronged test of privacy-that the claimant have an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. - U.S. __, 99 S.Ct. at 2580.
Yet, the majority neglected to consider the second thoughts which Justice Harlan later ex-
pressed about his "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (dissenting opinion). In his dissenting opinion in United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), he wrote:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we as-
sume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules of customs and
values of the past and present.
Id. at 786. In his view, therefore, "talismanic" adherence to the reasonable expectation of
privacy test would confine the Fourth Amendment protections to the status quo. He main-
tained that those protections should not be bound strictly to an existing societal conception
of them, but rather should be examined in the light of the type of social order and values
that in the Court's judgment are desirable goals. Harlan stated:
Since it is the task of the law to form and project as well as to mirror and reflect,
we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examin-
ing the desirability of saddling them upon society.
Id.
Lower courts applying the privacy test have reached varying results in advance-notice
cases. In People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App.3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974), police
officers in a helicopter discovered stolen automobile parts in the defendant's backyard. The
California court apparently concluded that the well-established routine of police aerial pa-
trol in the area put the defendant on notice that he could not, under the circumstances,
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1973), however, the court rejected the government's argument that a defendant who, while
undergoing an airport search, was found to have a concealed gun in his carry-on luggage,
could not have a justifiable expectation of privacy. The court pointed out that the frequency
of airport searches did not negate any expectation of privacy, nor could the government
avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment simply by notifying the public of intended
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The Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland"s does
not set a clear precedent for the resolution of all advance-notice
issues. The Court's discussion' was closely tied to the specific facts
presented, as is true of advance-notice cases generally. Neverthe-
less, the decision is bound to give impetus towards judicial nega-
tion of privacy interests at least in factual situations sufficiently
analogous to that of Smith as to justify finding the presence of the
three elements which, in the majority's view, were dispositive: (1)
advance-notice, whether constructive or actual, (2) voluntary expo-
sure of the asserted privacy interest to third parties, and (3) as-
sumption of risk.
C. Weighing, Balancing, and Drawing Lines
1. Balancing Generally
There is an obvious tension in Fourth Amendment adjudica-
tion between the need for delineating clear and, at times, rigid
rules so as to guide law enforcement officials in the conduct of
their investigations and the countervailing need for keeping the
amendment's contours fluid "so as to guide its extensibility over
searches.
The interrelationship between expectation and consent has played a central role in an-
other category of advance-notice cases involving "searches" conducted pursuant to regula-
tions, contractual provisions, or posted notices which are specifically brought to the atten-
tion of the defendant. See generally Note, 76 MicH. L. REv. 154, 159-60, 164-66 (1974). In
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1971), a student had signed
a dormitory contract agreeing to allow the university to inspect the premises "under the
regular procedure of the University." Id. at 438, 272 A.2d at 274-75. Law enforcement offi-
cials accompanied by university authorities subsequently raided the student's room and dis-
covered marijuana. The court rejected the prosecution's argument that under the circum-
stances the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the room.
It held that even if the university had the right to inspect the room for damages and for
violations of safety regulations, the student nevertheless was entitled to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the room. Id. at 436, 272 A.2d at 273. Furthermore, the
court held that the scope of the defendant's consent to inspection of his room was limited to
university authorities for limited purposes and did not extend to police searches. Id.
In other contexts courts have accepted the argument that an explicit reservation of the
right to search defeated Fourth Amendment protection. In Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475
S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1971), the defendant's knowledge that the police department he worked for
kept the keys to all the employee lockers and which asserted a right to search them at any
time led the court to uphold the validity of a department's search of the defendant's locker.
In State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970), a store employee and a police
officer standing over a ventilator in the ceiling of the store's restroom observed homosexual
activity. Although excluding the evidence so obtained under Katz, the Minnesota court indi-
cated that the store could have prevented a reasonable expectation of privacy by posting
warning signs that the premises were subject to surveillance and hence could have validly
conducted the same search. Id. at 211-12, 177 N.W.2d at 804.
425. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979).
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the unexpected.""" Katz is illustrative of judicial recognition for
such doctrinal flexibility. In imposing Fourth Amendment restric-
tions on government use of electronic surveillance and in rejecting
the trespass formula as the exclusive measure of Fourth Amend-
ment coverage, the Court's holding had the effect of expanding
rather than generally reconstructing the boundaries of the amend-
ment's protection. 27 Due to the rapidity of technological innova-
tion and the "'frightening paraphenalia which the vaulted marvels
of an electronic age may visit upon human society' 'p428 courts are
hard-pressed to develop coherent principles for defining "searches"
and "seizures" not knowing what new modes of government intru-
sion will emerge from the "Pandora's box" of police practices to-
morrow.42 9 In short, as Justice Frankfurter once observed, "'the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be distilled from contem-
poraneous history.' ,,480
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court il-
lustrate the Court's concern for both doctrinal definiteness and
doctrinal flexibility, and the role of each to implement the protec-
tive purpose of the Fourth Amendment. In Dunaway v. New
York43 1 the Court refused to apply an indefinite multifactor bal-
ancing test of the reasonableness of police conduct to all seizures
not amounting to a technical arrest.8 2 Instead it insisted on com-
pliance with the traditional standard of probable cause because
only it provided "the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to
the implementation of a workable rule."4 83 In Delaware v.
Prouse434 the Supreme Court held that in order to stop a vehicle
and detain its driver for a check of the motorist's license and the
car's registration, police had to have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or that the vehicle is unre-
gistered. The Court thereby imposed Fourth Amendment restric-
tions on the area of discretionary police license checks-an area
which had previously been unregulated and open to abuse. The
Court's holdings in these two cases indicate its commitment to a
three-tiered model of Fourth Amendment protection: (1) probable
cause remains the general prerequisite for serious intrusions on in-
426. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 386.
427. Id. at 385.
428. Id. at 386, quoting from Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
429. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 387.
430. Id. at 396.
431. - U.S. 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979).
432. - U.S. , 99 S.Ct. at 2257.
433. - U.S..., 99 S.Ct. at 2257-58.
434. - U.S. 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979).
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dividual privacy interests; (2) a narrow group of investigatory de-
tentions, precautionary searches and administrative inspections
are, however, permitted upon a showing less stringent than crimi-
nal probable cause; (3) other non-search and non-seizure en-
counters need no Fourth Amendment protection and are governed
only by the discretion of public officials. The Court's holdings will
be considered against the backdrop of the flexible sliding scale
model of Fourth Amendment coverage which the case law of the
past decade has intimated.
Traditionally the Fourth Amendment has been treated as a
monolith.8 Of the innumerable gradations of government intru-
sion into individual interest only those invasions which are suffi-
ciently far-reaching to be judicially labeled a "search" or "seizure"
are subject to the extensive restrictions' 3 6 of the amendment. Po-
435. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 388.
436. Id. at 358. According to the language of the Fourth Amendment "searches" and
"seizures" are prohibited only if they are unreasonable. See id. In United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the United States Supreme Court adopted the so-called "general
reasonableness theory" stating that the amendment does not demand a warrant in every
case. It condemns only unreasonable searches and seizures-reasonableness to be deter-
mined under "the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 63. Since 1950, however, the
Court has held that " 'the definition of reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the [Fourth Amendment's] warrant clause." Amsterdam, Perspectives,
supra note 62, at 358 quoting from United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
315 (1972). Under this so-called warrant theory the Court has consistently invalidated war-
rantless searches and seizures (see Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 358) subject
only to a few "jealously and carefully drawn exceptions." Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499 (1958). The controversy between the warrant-requirement model and the general-
reasonableness model is best exemplified by the debate between the majority and the dis-
sent in United States v. Rabinowitz.
Even relatively recent majority opinions of the Supreme Court can be found supporting
either of these two competing conceptions of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is well settled . . . that a search conducted
without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 'per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' "); but see United States v. Ed-
wards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (It is "no answer" to say that the police could have obtained a
search warrant, for the test is "not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search itself was reasonable." Id. at 807). Compare Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948), with Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 448 (1973); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 318 (1971); and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1950) (overruled on
other grounds in Chimel v. California). Cf. A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASES, 1-215 (3rd ed. 1974) ("It is therefore fair to describe the state of Fourth
Amendment law as a game professedly played under general-reasonableness rules, actually
played for the most part under warrant-theory rules, and subject, from time to time, to the
wild card of general reasonableness turning up." Id.). See also LaFave, Warrantless
Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the "Quagmire", 8 CRIM. L. BUL.
9 (1972); and Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1974)
("The courts have said little of lasting significance about the relationship between the two
clauses [the 'warrant' clause and the 'reasonableness' clause]." Id. at 48).
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lice activities which are not labeled "searches" or "seizures," on
the other hand, are not ordinarily circumscribed by either the war-
rant requirement or the reasonableness standard.3 7 To a limited
extent the Court has moved away from the monolithic model and
towards a sliding-scale approach to Fourth Amendment coverage.
Under this approach the protections of the amendment are gradu-
ated in proportion to the degree of government intrusion into the
interests in "human dignity and privacy. '43 Case law extending
back more than a decade supports the proposition that increasing
degrees of intrusiveness require increasingly stringent procedures
for the establishment of that justification.3 9
To date the Court has applied the balancing approach in three
principal areas: (1) in administrative searches, (2) in stop-and-frisk
police encounters, and (3) in border searches. In each area the
Court requires a showing less particularized than traditional prob-
able cause as the prerequisite for a valid search. The applicable
test was articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court.4" 0 The Court
there held that administrative warrantless inspection of private
residences significantly impinges on interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 4 1 Nevertheless the Court refused to require
the inspector to establish probable cause to believe that a particu-
lar dwelling violated the provisions of the housing code before a
warrant could issue. Instead the Court balanced the need to search
437. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 388.
438. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
439. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for instance, the Court authorized investiga-
tive searches, i.e., a brief on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk or patdown for
weapons, upon less than probable cause for arrest. The Court held that a stop-and-frisk was
a search and seizure and therefore was subject to Fourth Amendment control, but because it
was less intrusive than a full-blown arrest and search incident to an arrest, a lesser degree of
justification was required for it. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Su-
preme Court held that searches which invade the body, specifically the extraction of blood
by means of a hypodermic needle, intruded more upon the "interests in human dignity and
privacy" than do external bodily searches and demand greater justification. Id. at 769-70.
Whereas a warrantless external body search may be made incident to an arrest, Schmerber
states that warrantless searches invading the body wall of the arrestee may only be made
when the delay necessary to acquire a warrant would frustrate the purpose of the search.
Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra note 62, at 390 n.393. The case indicates in dictum that
body-breaching searches would be allowable only upon "a clear indication that... evidence
will be found." 384 U.S. at 770. That statement implies a standard more rigorous than prob-
able cause. Another indication of a graduated approach to the Fourth Amendment is found
in the suggestion in David v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), that detention for finger
printing might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment even without traditional probable cause since it might "constitute a much less
serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions."
Id. at 727.
440. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
441. Id. at 534.
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against the invasion of privacy which the inspection entailed 442 and
concluded that administrative searches of private property predi-
cated upon area-wide warrants were not violative of the Fourth
Amendment.44a The area warrant could issue based upon an ap-
praisal of the conditions in the geographical area as a whole, but
would not necessarily depend upon the agency's knowledge of the
condition in each particular building. 444
One year later in Terry v. Ohio"5 the Court again applied the
balancing approach to stop-and-frisk police encounters. The Court
balanced the societal interests" in crime prevention and detection
and in the police officer's safety against the stigma of a public de-
tention and search."7 It held that police may conduct precaution-
ary searches and seizures upon less than probable cause provided
that the police have a reasonable suspicion based on their experi-
ence that criminal activity is afoot and that the seized person is
armed and dangerous."48
The influence of Terry is clearly evident in the border search
cases, the third category in which the Court has applied the bal-
ancing approach to Fourth Amendment issues. Routine border
searches have traditionally been considered as an exception to
Fourth Amendment protection,"' the mere fact of crossing the
border being sufficient cause for such a search.45  Nevertheless,
some evidence, though less than probable cause, is required for
more serious intrusions. A "real suspicion" is required to conduct a
442. Id. at 537. The Court in Camara considered such factors as the the long history
of public and judicial acceptance of inspection programs, the public's interest in abating
dangerous conditions, and the minimal intrusiveness of inspections which are neither per-
sonal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of crime. Id. at 537-38.
443. Id.; See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
444. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
445. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
446. Id. at 22-24. The societal interests mitigating in favor of such stop-and-frisk au-
thority included the public interest in effective crime prevention and detection of crime as
well as protection of police and bystanders. Id.
447. Id. at 24-25. "Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes
a severe, though brief intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id.
448. Id. at 27, 30. "[11n justifying the particular facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21.
449. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); United
States v. Bowman, 502 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Warner, 441
F.2d 821, 832 (5th Cir. 1974).
450. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1977) ("such stops and searches need
not be grounded in any articulable and particularized suspicion."). See also United States v.
Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (1974). See generally 3 LAFAvE, supra note 340, at 276-81.
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strip search,451 whereas a "clear indication" is necessary for an ex-
amination of "body cavities.''5 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
held that vehicle stops for questioning at permanent immigration
checkpoints require no probable cause, the intrusion being so mini-
mal that no particularized reason need be given to justify it.4e 3 In
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce it was held that a brief Terry-
type stop of a vehicle by a roving border patrol to question the
occupants about their citizenship and immigration status and to
ask them to explain suspicious circumstances may only be made
upon "reasonable suspicion" grounded on "specific articulable
facts."45 The search of a vehicle either at traffic checkpoints re-
moved from the border 4 5 or by roving patrols456 requires probable
cause or consent. Hence, varying degrees of justification are re-
quired in border or near-border situations, with the border search
requiring the lowest degree; the roving patrol stop an intermediate
standard of "reasonable suspicion," and the search removed from
the border the highest degree. 57
2. Delaware v. Prouse: Random Vehicular License Checks
In Delaware v. Prouse'" the Supreme Court last term consid-
ered the constitutionality of police spot checks of driver's licenses
and vehicle registration on less than probable cause or articulable
suspicion. 59 In that case a police officer had stopped the defen-
dant's automobile to conduct a routine driver's license and vehicle
registration check. As he approached the vehicle, he smelled mari-
juana. He then seized the marijuana lying in plain view on the floor
of the car and arrested the defendant. During a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing the officer testified "that prior to stopping the vehicle
he had observed neither traffic nor equipment violations nor any
suspicious activity and that he made the stop only in order to
451. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 390 F.2d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1967).
452. Id.
453. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976).
454. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975). Factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop include: proxim-
ity to the border, normal traffic patterns on the highway, the officer's experience with alien
traffic, the driver's behavior, erratic or evasive driving, appearance of the occupants, type of
vehicle and weight of the load, and recent reports of illegal border crossings. Id.
455. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895-98 (1978); Note, 24 WAYNE L.
REv. 1123, 1127 (1978).
456. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
457. See Note, ST. MARY's L. REv. 570, 573-75 (1979).
458. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979).
459. Id. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
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check the driver's license and registration."4 " The Delaware Su-
preme Court had held that a random stop of an automobile solely
for the purpose of a document check was an unreasonable deten-
tion of its occupants,' indicating that such a police practice
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
constitution.6 2 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that police may not stop an automobile and detain
the driver in order to check his driver's license or the car's registra-
tion unless the investigating officers have at least an articulable
and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is unregistered. 6 s
In considering the constitutionality of such random police
stops the Court in Prouse applied the balancing test,' 64 selectively
drawing on principles established in the administrative search
cases, the border cases, and in Terry v. Ohio. Relying on both bor-
der patrol and administrative search cases, the Court emphasized
its concern for limiting the amount of discretion afforded an officer
in the field.6 5 Balancing the countervailing interests the Court
held that the state's interest in the promotion of highway safety
and in the enforcement of its licensing laws did not clearly out-
weigh the intrusions upon the physical freedom and psychological
security of the motoring public.'6 Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded, the discretionary spot check only marginally advanced the
state's interest in roadway safety." 7 In view of its intrusion upon
individual privacy, discretionary document checks could not there-
fore qualify as reasonable law enforcement practices under the
Fourth Amendment. 68 By insisting on a "reasonable and articul-
460. Id. at - , 99 S.Ct. at 1394.
461. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Del. 1978).
462. Id. at 1362.
463. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. __, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979). Before the Su-
preme Court's holding in Prouse, there was a considerable body of case law indicating that
random police stops to examine driver's licenses or vehicle registration even without prior
observation of any offense were lawful. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713, 715
(10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cross, 437 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971); Myricks v. United
States, 370 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1967); see generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, at 380-86;
Note, 14 Hous. L. REV. 936, 938 (1977); Note, 55 NEB. L. REv. 316, 318 (1976); Note, 25
STAN. L. REV. 865, 870 (1973); Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 570, 576 (1979).
464. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. __, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396. The Court stated that
"the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's governmental interests." Id.
465. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-97, 1400-01.
466. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1398-99 (1979).
•467. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1399-1400.
468. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. In the Court's view there were less intrusive and
more productive mechanisms available for promoting the state's interests, such as checking
documents after observed traffic violations, id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1399; questioning of all
persons at roadblock-type stops, id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; enforcing annual safety in-
[Vol. 41
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able suspicion" that a driver is unlicensed or that a vehicle is unre-
gistered as a prerequisite for a document check the Court showed a
marked predilection for standardizing the various guidelines which
permit a police officer to detain an individual on less than probable
cause.""' Prior to its holding in Prouse there was an obvious dis-
crepancy between the highly discretionary license check proce-
dures permitted by many state courts4 70 and the standard of
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" as a prerequisite for con-
ducting short investigatory stops firmly established by the Su-
preme Court in recent border patrol cases 471 and in Terry v.
Ohio.4 2 In imposing a standard of "reasonable suspicion" the
Court in Prouse, as in Terry and in the border patrol cases, was
concerned with preventing pretext investigations and stops based
merely on an officer's uninformed suspicion, his "hunches," or a
desire to harass. 3
In bringing the standards governing spot license checks into
conformity with analogous investigatory detentions and seizures by
law enforcement officers, the Court also rejected Delaware's appar-
ent argument that the Court's administrative inspection cases
should be dispositive .47 The Court rejected the suggestion that the
spections, id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1398-99; and stopping vehicles with observable safety de-
fects, id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1399.
469. Note, 11 ST. MARY's L. REV. 570, 580 (1979).
470. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, at 380-82. Prior to the Supreme Court's
holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1 (1968), that the Fourth Amendment governed all
seizures of a person and not merely formal "arrests," some state courts had held that the
brief detention of a motorist occasioned by a license check did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment since no "arrest" had occurred. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 340, at 381. Other state
courts employed a specious right-privilege distinction whereby holding a driver's license was
deemed to be a mere privilege granted solely by statute and subject to statutory restriction
and police regulation. Id.
471. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (officers on roving
patrol may only stop vehicles if they are aware of specific and articulable facts that reasona-
bly warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (approving fixed-checkpoint stops as involving a lesser sub-
jective intrusion on the motorist than the intrusion occasioned by a stop by a roving patrol).
472. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
473. See Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. - 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 270 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). But see United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (license stop search described as valid). The Montana Supreme Court
has also invalidated stops based on mere suspicion or conjecture. See State v. Lahr, 172
Mont. 32, 560 P.2d 527 (1977); State v. Marshall, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 909 (1977).
474. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. - , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400-01 (1979). It has been
suggested that any assessment of the reasonableness of spot licensing checks requires con-
sideration of the three balancing factors set out in Camara: (1) the amount of public inter-
est in the government intrusion, (2) the inability to accomplish the results by following the
usual probable cause standard, and (3) the extent of the intrusion into individual privacy as
a result of the act. See 3 LAFAVE supra note 340, at 382-83; Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 570,
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substantial state regulation of automobiles was comparable to per-
vasive government regulation of certain industries,Th participation
in which has been held to amount to consent to regulatory restric-
tions and administrative inspections.4 76 As the Court pointed out,
there are substantially different factors to be considered in the li-
cense check context. In the Court's view, automobile travel is so
pervasive and so necessary in our society that government regula-
tion of automobile use should not be found to defeat the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy people sense in traveling by automobile.
The Court's rationale is cogent. Private motorists, unlike business-
men in heavily regulated industries, do not subject themselves to
the full rigors of administrative inspection merely by using the
578 (1979). See also note 440-44 and accompanying text supra. First, the need to enforce
motor vehicle safety standards is indisputably at least as compelling as the public need to
conduct housing inspections as permitted in Camara. See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note
340, at 383; Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 570, 578 n.70 (1979). Secondly, it has been argued
that just as there is no generally effective way of determining the probability of dangerous
conditions from outside a building, it is unusual to detect any observable indication of a
licensing violation of a moving vehicle and hence that vehicle stops at the discretion of the
police are the only effective means of enforcing licensing requirements. 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 340, at 384. In Prouse, however, the Court rejected that argument, presuming instead
that unlicensed drivers are less safe than licensed drivers and hence that their more reckless
propensities would exhibit themselves. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. __, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
1399 (1979). Furthermore, the Court assumed that completely random document checks
would not effectively deter unlicensed persons from driving. Id. With respect to the third
criterion, the intrusiveness of a document check is arguably minimal; the detention is nor-
mally very brief, no search is involved, and the driver ordinarily may remain seated in his
vehicle. See generally Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 570, 579 (1979). But see Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121 (1977) (driver ordered to exit vehicle and submit to a "pat-down"
for weapons when officer noticed a suspicious bulge under the driver's jacket). Yet the Court
in Prouse implicitly disagreed with such an evaluation of the intrusiveness of document
checks by roving police patrols. It repeatedly stressed the unsettling emotional and psycho-
logical effect of such stops. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. __, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1397-98
(1979). By rejecting, in the context of license checks, the notion that participation in a regu-
lated activity implied consent to regulatory inspection, id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 1400-01, the
Court effectively held that private motorists enjoy a greater expectation of privacy in their
cars than businessmen enjoy in their regulated business premises. Id.
A motorist's Fourth Amendment protection does not disappear simply because he en-
ters an automobile; nor does he lose all expectation of privacy merely because the automo-
bile is subject to government regulation. Logically, therefore, the Court must have consid-
ered random license checks to constitute a greater invasion of privacy than is posed by
routine administrative searches of pervasively regulated businesses. In addition, regulatory
searches are subject tc the requirement of an area warrant whereas discretionary license
checks by roving police patrols have traditionally lacked any formalized Fourth Amendment
protection.
475. Id. at 1400.
476. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (federal inspection of
firearms: "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to
accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms,
and ammunition will be subjected to effective inspection."); Colonade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (federal regulation of liquor).
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public highways.'4 7 For, unlike businessmen in heavily regulated
industries, motorists do not derive substantial profits from engag-
ing in the regulated activity. Nor do private motorists, as one com-
mentator has noted, "enjoy the kinds of monopolistic privileges
that accompany licenses to sell guns or liquor.'
' 78
In view of the Court's concern for the "grave danger" of abuse
of official discretion,' ' its imposition in Prouse of a standard of
"reasonable suspicion" provides established criteria by which fu-
ture confrontations between police and motorists will be ex-
amined.'80 Where there is a substantial danger of official abuse of
discretion the Court will undoubtedly require a minimum standard
of "reasonable suspicion" to justify a contested police practice.' 81
This conclusion is borne out by the Supreme Court's recent hold-
ing in Brown v. Texas.482 The Court there held that the Fourth
Amendment does not permit police to stop and demand identifica-
tion "from an individual without any specific basis for believing he
is involved in criminal activity . . . .When such a stop is not
based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police
practices exceeds tolerable limits."'
83
3. Dunaway v. New York: Detentions for Custodial Interrogation
In another recent case, Dunaway v. New York,' 8 ' the United
States Supreme Court declined to adopt a proposed "multifactor
balancing test" whereby an officer would "weigh .. .the manner
and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved
and the circumstances attending the encounter"' 85 in judging a de-
tention "indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."'8 6 In Duna-
way the Supreme Court held, "[D]etention for custodial interroga-
tion-regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the
traditional safeguards against illegal arrest."'87 The Court refused
to extend the holding of Terry v. Ohio 88 and apply a balancing
477. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
478. Note, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1123, 1134 (1978).
479. Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. _, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979).
480. Id.
481. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See generally 25 STAN. L. REv. 865, 869 (1973).
482. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979).
483. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. 2641.
484. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979).
485. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2256-57 nn.14 & 16.
486. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2256.
487. Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2258.
488. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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test to situations other than those already found to fall "far short
of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest. 4 8 9 The "reason-
able suspicion" standard propounded in Terry was found inappli-
cable where custodial interrogation was involved because the intru-
sion is then very close to that associated with an arrest.
The elements which the Court found rendered the detention
of the defendant for custodial interrogation in Dunaway indistin-
guishable from a traditional arrest were (1) the questioning was
not brief, (2) the questioning did not occur where the defendant
was found, and (3) the defendant was not free to leave. The fact
that he was not told that he was under arrest, was not booked, and
would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had
proved fruitless did not lessen the degree of intrusion to the type
outlined by Terry and its progeny. As the Court pointed out,
"[A] ny 'exception' that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in
this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth
Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable
cause."4 90 Thus, probable cause was required before the police
could engage in custodial interrogation.
Taken together the Supreme Court's holdings in Dunaway
and Prouse indicate an evolving commitment to a three-tiered
model of the Fourth Amendment in the area of investigative inter-
rogation. At one end of the scale, probable cause is necessary for
lengthy detentions and severe intrusion on individual freedom and
privacy. At the opposite end of the scale lies an amorphous body of
investigative police activity presumptively free of Fourth Amend-
ment restraint. The decisions in Dunaway and Prouse illustrate
the judicial desire for doctrinal clarity in the interest of providing
clear rules for the guidance of police officers and other governmen-
tal agents in the field. Indeed, the wholesale adoption of a mul-
489. Dunaway v. New York, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2255, 2556 (1979). The
Court held:
The narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a balancing test
rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be
supported by the "long prevailing standards" of probable cause only because these
intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.
Id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2256 [citation omitted].
490. Id. at - , 99 SCt. at 2256. The Court stated:
[Tihe protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the
consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by differ-
ent cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by
police officers engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
. . . For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite "balancing" has
been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that
seizures "are reasonable" only if supported by probable cause.
Id. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2257.
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tifactor sliding scale model of Fourth Amendment protection
might convert the Fourth Amendment "into one immense Rohr-
schach blot,"'4 91 rendering an already confused area of the law im-
possible for police to comprehend. In practice, a generalized sliding
scale approach means that appellate courts would defer to the trial
court's determination of reasonableness in the first instance and
trial courts would defer to the police.49 The police, in turn, would
be without the benefit of any guidelines and, hence, would act
upon their own uninformed discretion. While there is a need for
the doctrinal flexibility in order to guard against unexpected police
practices, there is also a need for some doctrinal definiteness in
order to implement the underlying protective purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.
VI. SPEEDY TRIAL
The Montana Supreme Court decided six decisions on speedy
trial issues during the period of this survey. 93 These decisions are
not marked by any radical changes in the test first laid down by
the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo"94 and subse-
quently adopted by the Montana Supreme Court. They do, how-
ever, fill out details of the test as previously applied and demon-
strate that the test is truly a case-by-case balancing test with no
particular factor being determinative. Because the Montana deci-
sions do little more than explicate Barker, it seems unnecessary to
analyze each case individually.
491. Amsterdam, Perspectives, supra, note 62, at 393.
492. Id. at 394.
493. State v. Bretz, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 974, cert. denied, __ U.S. - , 100
S.Ct. 529 (1979); State v. Harvey, - Mont. -, 603 P.2d 661 (1979); State v. Dess, -
Mont. - , 602 P.2d 142 (1979); State v. Freeman, - Mont. -, 599 P.2d 368 (1979);
State v. Puzio, - Mont. - , 595 P.2d 1163 (1979); State v. Tiedemann, - Mont.
-, 584 P.2d 1284 (1978).
494. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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